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ABSTRACT

The Federal Circuit's Super Sack decision is striking: a patentee's covenant-not-tosue for infringement divested the court of subject-matter jurisdiction in deciding the
invalidity counterclaim. However, the intent and spirit of the Declaratory Judgment
Act and of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(2) suggest that Super Sack may
have missed the mark. An in-depth analysis of the Declaratory Judgment Act,
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(2), and post-Super Sack patent cases reveals
numerous policy reasons for the Federal Circuit to overturn Super Sack.
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INTRODUCTION
Successfully defending against a patent infringement claim is always a good
thing, but when a plaintiff is able to avoid allegations of patent invalidity and
inequitable conduct by withdrawing its initial claim of patent infringement, the
defendant's victory could be considered a pyrrhic one. Allowing a plaintiff, after
years of expensive trial preparation, to walk away from a lawsuit it no longer wishes
to pursue leaves a defendant the victor of the infringement battle outflanked on the
invalidity and unenforceability fronts. It is unsettling for a plaintiff to be able to
avoid confronting the defendant's counterclaims merely because the plaintiff is
unwilling to continue a patent infringement lawsuit due to the discovery of damning
evidence. This problem is particularly acute when such evidence is the basis for the
defendant's declaratory judgment counterclaims of invalidity or unenforce ability.
A simple promise not to sue provides a district court judge the means to dismiss
a pesky and long running patent infringement suit because the promise divests the
court of jurisdiction. In most cases, a defendant would be happy to avoid a finding of
infringement, even after financing a legal defense for several years, if for no other
reason than liability is no longer at issue. It may be of no consequence to a defendant
that a plaintiff can continue to assert its patents against others. There are, however,
those rare occasions in which the evidence a plaintiff wishes to avoid becoming public
impacts the rights of others, or when allowing a plaintiff to walk away scot-free does
not seem equitable. The holding of one such case, Super Sack Manufacturing.Corp.
v. Chase Packaging Corp.,1 could surprise patent litigators who have traditionally
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1 57 F.3d 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
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thought that filing invalidity or unenforceability declaratory judgment counterclaims
in an infringement action would keep the plaintiff in the case.
In Super Sack, the district court determined that it was divested of subjectmatter jurisdiction to adjudicate counterclaims of patent invalidity and noninfringement when the plaintiff promised, in a motion to dismiss, not to sue the
defendant on the patents-in-suit. 2 The plaintiffs motion to dismiss was based on two
alternate grounds: 3
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("FRCP") 12(b)(1) 4 and
5
41(a)(2).
The plaintiffs motion to dismiss was granted because it had
"unconditionally promised not to sue [the defendant] in the future for infringement of
the patents-in-suit with respect to any products currently manufactured or sold by
[the defendant] ."6
The plaintiffs motion to dismiss, which included its promise not to sue, was filed
virtually on the eve of trial, after six years of intense litigation and extensive
discovery. 7 When the motion to dismiss was filed, counterclaims of invalidity and
non-infringement as well as a summary judgment motion were still before the court,
as was defendant's motion for leave to amend its answer to include a claim of
unenforceability of the patents-in-suit based on inequitable conduct.8 Despite this,
the district court granted the plaintiffs motion to dismiss, finding that the court was
divested of subject-matter jurisdiction over the non-infringement counterclaim.9 It
also held moot the defendant's patent invalidity counterclaim, as well as the
defendant's motion to amend its answer to add a count of unenforceability. 10 The
order failed to state whether the basis of the dismissal was FRCP 12(b)(1) or
41(a)(2).11

2 Id.

at 1056-57.

aid.
4FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) ("Every defense to a claim for relief in any pleading must be asserted
in the responsive pleading if one is required. But a party may assert the following defenses by

motion: (1) lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.").
Id. 41(a)(2).

Except as provided in Rule 41(a)(1), an action may be dismissed at the plaintiffs
request only by court order, on terms that the court considers proper. If a
defendant has pleaded a counterclaim before being served with the plaintiffs
motion to dismiss, the action may be dismissed over the defendant's objection only
if the counterclaim can remain pending for independent adjudication. Unless the
order states otherwise, a dismissal under this paragraph (2) is without prejudice.

Id.
(3SuperSaek, 57 F.3d at 1057.
7Id. at 1055-56.
8 Id. at 1056.
9 Id. at 1057 ("Plaintiff reports that it has unconditionally promised not to sue Defendant in
the future on the patents-in-suit. Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiffs Rule 12(b)(1) and Rule
41(a)(2) Motion to Dismiss to be [sic, is] proper and should be granted.").
10Id. ("In the opinion of this Court, Defendant's Motion o Amend its Pleadings in order to
amend its pleadings to include the defense of inequitable conduct/unenforceability... fails to
present sufficient evidence that a continuing case or controversy is present necessitating the
continuance of this litigation.").
11Id. The order references both FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1) and FED. R. CIV. P. 41(a)(2) but does
not identify which of those two rules was the basis for the court's decision. -,d.
("Therefore, the Court
finds that Plaintiffs Rule 12(b)(1) and Rule 41(a)(2) Motion to Dismiss to be [sic, is] proper and
should be granted.").
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The defendant appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit ("Federal Circuit"), arguing that all of the issues in the case required
adjudication by the district court 12 in view of the then-recent holding by the Supreme
Court in Cardinal Chemical Co. v. Morton International,Inc. 13 The defendant
argued that Cardinal Chemical stood for the proposition that the issues of patent
invalidity and non-infringement were independent of each other. 14 Therefore,
according to the defendant, the district court erred when it dismissed the entire case,
including the defendant's counterclaims, just because the plaintiff withdrew its
infringement claim and promised not to sue the defendant in the future. 15 The
Federal Circuit clarified that Cardinal Chemical did not stand for the proposition
that the issues of patent invalidity and non-infringement are always independent,
but rather, that a Federal Circuit affirmance of a finding of non-infringement isnot a

16
sufficient reason, by itself, for vacating a declaratory judgment of patent invalidity.

According to the Federal Circuit, because it did not review a finding of noninfringement, CardinalChemicaldid not apply and it could affirm the district court's
dismissal.1 7 The Federal Circuit also noted that because the defendant was no longer
in apprehension of a future claim of infringement on the patents-in-suit for products
it had been making, the district court correctly dismissed the case - including all
counterclaims. 18 The Federal Circuit reasoned that the promise not to sue was
sufficient to remove any "case or controversy" under Article J119 and thus divested
20
the court of subject-matter jurisdiction.
12 Id.at

1060 ("Finally, [the defendant] attempts to cut our two-step justiciability analysis off

at the pass by arguing that the Supreme Court's decision in Cardinal Chemical Co. v. Morton
International, Ine., 'clearly upheld the separate viability of an invalidity counterclaim."' (citation
omitted)).
13 508 U.S. 83 (1993).
14 Super Sack, 57 F.3d at 1060 ("[The defendant] relies on the Court's observation [in Cardinal
ChemicaA that '[a] party seeking a declaratory judgment of invalidity presents a claim independent
of the patentee's charge of infringement' ....
(quoting CardinalChem., 508 U.S. at 96)).

15 d,
16Id.

The question actually before the Supreme Court in Cardinal [Chemica was
'whether the affirmance by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit of a
finding that a patent has not been infringed is a sufficient reason,' by itself 'for
vacating a decalaratory judgment holding the patent invalid.'
The Court
answered in the negative .... In other words, according to Cardinal[Chemical], a
claim for a declaratory judgment of invalidity is independent of the patentee's
charge of infringement in the following-and only the following-way: an affirmed
finding of non-infringement does not, without more, justify a reviewing court's
refusal to reach the trial court's conclusion on invalidity.
Id. (citation omitted).
17 Id,

The instant case comes to us in a posture far removed from the one scrutinized in
Cardinal[ChemicaA: here, the trial court neither made a finding on infringement
nor reached a conclusion on validity.
Cardinal [Chemical], addressed to the
propriety of appellate jurisdiction over final judgments respecting infringement
and validity, simply does not apply.
Id.
18Id.at 1059-60.
19 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under
this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which
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The Federal Circuit's affirming opinion found that dismissal was proper 21 even
though FRCP 41(a)(2) clearly states:
Except as provided in Rule 41(a)(1), an action may be dismissed at the
plaintiffs request only by court order, on terms that the court considers
proper. If a defendant has pleaded a counterclaim before being served with
the plaintiffs motion to dismiss, the action may be dismissed over the
defendant's objection only if the counterclaim can remain pending for
independent adjudication. Unless the order states otherwise, a dismissal
22
under this paragraph (2) is without prejudice.
The issue addressed in this article is whether divestiture of subject-matter

jurisdiction over the original infringement claim, by promise not to sue, also removes
the party's procedural right of independent adjudication of declaratory judgment
counterclaims in accordance with FRCP 41(a)(2). The argument is made that the
Super Sack precedent is in conflict with the spirit of Article III, the public policy
behind the Declaratory Judgment Act ("DJA"),23 and the plain meaning of FRCP
41(a)(2).

I. BACKGROUND OF THE DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACT

It may seem odd today that prior to 1934, a party had no individual right to seek
a declaratory judgment.2 4 The courts did not routinely recognize that parties could
seek judicial interpretations of their rights unless there was an active relief that

shall be made, under their Authority; -to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other
public Ministers and Consuls; -to all Cases of admiralty and maritime
Jurisdiction; -to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party; -to
Controversies between two or more States; -between a State and Citizens of
another State; -between Citizens of different States; -between Citizens of the
same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between a State,
or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.

Id., amended byU.S. CONST. amend. XI.
20 Super Sack, 57 F.3d at 1060.
The residual possibility of a future infringement suit based on [the defendant's]
future acts is simply too speculative a basis for jurisdiction over [it's] counterclaim
for declaratory judgments of invalidity. The only proper course for the trial court
was to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction, as it did.

Id.
21 Id. at 1060 ("The only proper course for the trial court was to dismiss the case for lack of
jurisdiction, as it did.").
22 FED. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2) (emphasis added).
23 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-02 (2006).
24 Donald L. Doernberg & Michael B. Mushlin, The Trolan Horse: How the Declaratory

Judgment Act Created a Cause of Action and Expanded Federal Jurisdiction While the Supreme
Court Wasn't Looking; 36 UCLA L. REV. 529, 561 (1989).
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could be granted. 25 Few judges or lawmakers were even cognizant of the concept of
declaratory judgments prior to

1919.26

It was through the efforts of Professors Borchard and Sunderland that the
concept of declaratory actions were brought to U.S. legal consciousness. 27 With the
support and impetus of the American Bar Association, 28 legislation codifying what is
today the Declaratory Judgment Act was introduced before Congress for the first
time in 1919.29 This legislation was initially defeated, but was reintroduced every
year thereafter until its eventual enactment in 1934.30
In the interceding 15 years between the first introduction of the Act in 1919 and
its eventual adoption, a struggle before the United States Supreme Court took place
in which the Court attempted to define the legality of declaratory judgments within
the framework of the Constitution.31 Several states enacted differing forms of
declaratory judgment laws only to have them struck down in what is referred to as
the "trilogy" of cases. 32 The Supreme Court determined in this trilogy that each of
the state laws in question were unconstitutional for a lack of "case or controversy"
under Article III, Section 2 of the United States Constitution.33 The Court went so
far as to state that a grant of declaratory judgment "is beyond the power conferred
upon the federal judiciary." 34 The trilogy of cases effectively acted as a "virtual
35
judicial veto" of the pending Act.

The Court, however, changed its stance a mere six years after the trilogy when it
reversed course and upheld a state declaratory judgment law in the 1933 case of

25

See id. at 562-64.

See id. at 550 ("Although other jurisdictions had used declaratory judgments for some time,
they were virtually unknown to American law until this century." (footnote omitted)).
27 See Edwin M. Borchard, The DeclaratoryJudgment-A Needed ProceduralReform, 28 YALE
L.J. 1 (1918) [hereinafter Borchard, PartA (analyzing the historical evolution and the purpose of the
declaratory judgment); Edwin M. Borchard, The Deelaratory Judgment-A Needed Procedural
Reform, 28 YALE L.J. 105 (1918) [hereinafter Borchard, Part IAl; Edson R. Sunderland, A Modern
Evolution in Remedial Rights,-The DeclaratoryJudgment, 16 MICH. L. REV. 69, 70 (1917).
28 Doernberg & Mushlin, supra note 24, at 550 n.94 ("As early as 1919, the American Bar
Association called the Declaratory Judgment Act '[t]he most important legislation of the year
affecting the administration of justice."' (quoting Comm. on Noteworthy Changes in Statute Law,
Am. Bar Ass'n, Report, in REPORT OF THE FORTY-SECOND ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION 277, 284 (1919)).
21)S. 5304, 65th Cong. (1919), available at 57 CONG. REC. 1080 (1919); Doernberg & Mushlin,
supra note 24, at 561.
30Doernberg & Mushlin, supra note 24, at 561.
31 Id. at 568-69.
32 Id. at 558-61; see Willing v. Chi. Auditorium Ass'n, 277 U.S. 274 (1928); Liberty Warehouse
Co. v. Burley Tobacco Growers' Coop. Mktg. Ass'n, 276 U.S. 71 (1928) [hereinafter Liberty
Warehouse 11; Liberty Warehouse Co. v. Grannis, 273 U.S. 70 (1927) [hereinafter Liberty
Warehouse 1. This "trilogy" of cases, WilHng, Liberty Warehouse I and Liberty Warehouse I,
generally made clear that declaratory judgments did not comport with the Supreme Court's
constitutional interpretation of "case or controversy." Doernberg & Mushlin, supra note 24, at 55861.
33 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
34 Wiling, 277 U.S. at 289.
35 Doernberg & Mushlin, supra note 24, at 560 (discussing the impact of Wiling, Liberty
Warehouse j and Liberty Warehouse Ifi.
26
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Nashville, Chattanooga& St. Louis Railway Co. v. Wallace.36 In its ruling, the Court
noted that a declaration of rights in the guise of a declaratory judgment was merely a
procedural tool and that such judgments did not run afoul of the Constitution as long
as they "involv[ed] a real, not a hypothetical, controversy."3 7 In finding the state
declaratory judgment law to be constitutional,38 the remaining restraint to
declaratory judgments was removed and the Supreme Court decision influenced
39
Congress' enactment of the DJA.
With the judicial objection on constitutional grounds seemingly removed,
Congress finally enacted the DJA in 1934.40
The DJA was thereafter ruled
constitutional in Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Haworth,41 which further enunciated
that "case of actual controversy" in the DJA refers to the type of "cases" and
"controversies" that are justiciable under Article III, Section 2.42
The Declaratory Judgment Act, as amended, states in pertinent part:
In a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction .... any court of the
United States, upon the filing of an appropriate pleading, may declare the
rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such
declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be sought. Any such
declaration shall have the force and effect of a final judgment or decree and
43
shall be reviewable as such.
Thus, the DJA allows courts of appropriate jurisdiction to declare the rights of
parties as long as they meet the underlying "case or controversy" requirement of
Article 111.44 In the area of patent law this issue rears its head most often in the form
of infringement threats brought by a patent owner against competitors or, more
45
insidiously, their customers.

36 288 U.S. 249, 263 (1933) ("While the ordinary course of judicial procedure results in a
judgment requiring an award of process or execution to carry it into effect, such relief is not an
indispensable adjunct to the exercise of the judicial function." (citing Fidelity Nat'l Bank & Trust Co.
v. Swope, 274 U.S. 123, 132 (1927))).
37 Id. at 264.
'38Id.

at 263-65.

3) See Doernberg and Mushlin, supra note 24, at 560-61 (noting that the trilogy of cases was
not specifically directed at the declaratory judgments legislation pending before Congress). The
Court's intent was to demarcate the bounds of the "case or controversy" language of Article 11. Id.
The legislation was actually an attempt to broaden federal subject matter jurisdiction rather than
an attempt to broaden the meaning of "case or controversy." Id.
40 Act of June 14, 1934, ch. 512, 48 Stat. 955 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2201-02
(2006)).

41300 U.S. 227 (1937).
42U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; Aetna Ins., 300 U.S. at 239-41.
43 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a).
44 Id.

4, See Spectronics Corp. v. H.B. Fuller Co., 940 F.2d 631, 632-633 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
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A. No Sham Lawsuits
The DJA is a procedural tool that allows a party to proactively seek a
declaration of its and an opposing party's rights without having to wait for the
opposing party to initiate a lawsuit. 46 This, "Damoclean threat"47 that hovered over
them arose when a suit was continually threatened but never instituted. 48 In patent
matters, this threat has a palpable significance: a patent holder could attempt
"extra-judicial patent enforcement with scare-the-customer-and-run tactics" that the
DJA was intended to forestall. 49 The DJA was meant to remove uncertainty,
insecurity and controversy on the part of a threatened party. 50 By bringing a
declaratory judgment action, a patent owner could be brought to either assert his
threat or to disavow it with prejudicial effect.

An example of the use of a patent to invoke the "Damoclean threat," one that is
well known in fields where patents are used to keep the competition at bay, is
instructive. A patent owner sends letters to alleged infringers or their customers
threatening legal action for infringement of one of its patents. Despite the repeated
threats, which understandably create some unease in the recipients, no suit is ever
actually brought by the patent owner, and the question of whether the accused
products infringe the patent, and indeed the patent's validity and enforceability,
never reach adjudication. Accused infringers never have the opportunity to judicially
determine whether their products indeed infringe. Rather, they are stuck in a patent
rights limbo while their business withers under the specter of an infringement suit,
or, alternatively, they continue to sell a product without knowing whether they are
amassing untold patent infringement damages that will ultimately put the business
at risk. This is not an unknown situation and, in fact, was outlined in one of the first
law review articles regarding patents and declaratory judgments in 1936.51 It is still

with us today, and is a method often used in suppressing competition or in the much
52
reviled patent troll game.
An even more insidious abuse occurs when the patent owner utilizes the judicial
system to support scare-and-run tactics against its competitors.53 Here, a patent
holder brings an incipient, and seemingly legitimate, lawsuit against one of its
46

Doernberg & Mushlin, supra note 24, at 562 n.154.

47Japan Gas Lighter Asso. v. Ronson Corp., 257 F. Supp. 219, 237 (D.N.J. 1966) ("The

Declaratory Judgment Act was designed to relieve potential defendants from the Damoclean threat
of impending litigation which a harassing adversary might brandish, while initiating suit at his
leisure - or never.").
48 Arrowhead Indus. Water, Inc. v. Ecolochem, Inc., 846 F.2d 731, 734-35 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
4 Id. at 735.

50EDWIN

BORCHARD, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS 21 (2nd ed. 1941) (describing a declaratory

judgment as a "negative declaration" that removes the clouds surrounding a legal interest).
51Note, Federal Jurisdiction Over Declaratory Judgment Proceedings in Patent Cases, 45
YALE L. J. 1287 (1936); see also Am. Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257 (1916)
(discussing the same set of circumstances described, for which the only action available to the
accused infringer was an action in libel); Doernberg & Mushlin, supra note 24, at 582 (discussing
this scenario in light of the enactment of the Declaratory Judgment Act).
52 Robert P. Taylor, Patent Law in Flux: Echoes of the Supreme Court, in 14TH ANNUAL
INSTITUTE ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 2008, at 93, 114 n.27 (PLI Patents, Copyrights,

Trademarks, & Literary Prop., Course Handbook Series No. 14967, 2008), available at WL, 947
PLI/Pat 93.
53 See Arrowhead Indus. Water, Inc., v. Ecolochem, Inc., 846 F.2d 731, 734-35 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
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competitors with no intention of actually seeing the suit through to a final
judgment. 54 In most instances, the patent owner chooses a competitor-defendant who
is less able to sustain the intensive management of time and exorbitant costs
55
required to defend a patent action.
The suit is a heavy club used to pummel the defendant with the expectation that
the accused infringer will quickly change its product at some retooling cost, enter
into a burdensome licensing agreement, or settle the case in order to avoid protracted
litigation. 56 Once one defendant has succumbed to this pressure, the patent owner
often uses that surrender to scare additional potential defendants into settling their
lawsuits. 57 But for the DJA, these tactics would be an extremely effective way to
stifle competition. 58 However, the added advantage of granting the plaintiff-patent
owner a way to quickly withdraw from a losing case by a submitting a mere covenant
not to sue stacks the deck in favor of the patent owner. Also, this tactic may be
viewed by some unscrupulous patent owners as a powerful gambit without any real
adverse consequences.
When using the DJA in the foregoing scenarios, recourse may be had whereby
the threat of a lawsuit, and possibly mounting damages, is removed and economic
competition is promoted. The DJA is also effective when used in a counterclaim to an
infringement action, when a patent has infirmities that can be used to attack its
validity or enforceability, but only if certain forms are followed. 59 The right to
maintain the declaratory judgment action after a plaintiff has conceded noninfringement was seemingly precluded by the Super Sack holding. 60 However, due to
an unstated recognition by courts that the Super Sack holding resulted in pernicious
and unintended effects, and to avoid its more controversial results, the rule in Super
Sack has been eroded by subsequent cases. 61

54 Jean Carlos Lopez, Weapon of Mass Coercion: How Ebay Inc. v. Mercexehange, L.L. C.
Eliminated the Threat of Coercive Automatic PermanentInjunctive Relief and Restored Balance to
the American Patent System, 60 OKLA. L. REV. 605, 605 (2007) (noting that patent holders stifle
competition by accusing others of infringement and threatening costly litigation). See also Scott D.
Helsel, PreventingPredatoryAbuses in Litigation Between Business Competitors: Focusing on a
Litigant's Reasons for Initiating the Litigation to Ensure a Balance Between the Constitutional
Right to Petition and the Sherman Act's Guarantee of Fair Competition in Business, 36 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1135, 1143 (1995) (discussing generally litigation, its cost, and its effect on
competition).
55 Cf Arrowhead,846 F.2d at 738 ("The law does not require enterprises to keep their heads in
the sand while a patentee picks them off one by one and at its leisure.").
56 See Lopez, supranote 54, at 605.
57 Id.

5SLisa A. Dolak, DeelaratoryJudgment Jurisdictionin Patent Cases: Restoring The Balance
Between The PatenteeAnd The Accused Infringer, 38 B.C. L. REV 903, 903 (1997).
59 See Cardinal Chem. Co. v. Morton Int'l, Inc., 508 U.S. 83, 96 (1993).
(30Super Sack Mfg. Corp. v. Chase Packaging Corp., 57 F.3d 1054, 1060 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
(31See, e.g., Fort James Corp. v. Solo Cup Co., 412 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
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B. A ClearlyDefined Issue for Court: Does the Holdingin
Super Sack Remain Valid?
A court's ability to issue a declaratory judgment ruling while avoid issuing
advisory opinions is clearly defined - a court must employ the "all the circumstances"
test as developed by the Supreme Court eight years after the passage of the DJA in
Maryland Casualty Co. v. Pacific Coal & Oil Co. 62 This test states that "[b]asically,
the question in each case is whether the facts alleged, under all the circumstances,
show that there is a substantial controversy, between parties having adverse legal
interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory
63
judgment."
From this, Federal Circuit case law involving DJA actions in patent matters
developed a two-part justiciability test to determine whether an "actual controversy"
exists. 6 4 The Federal Circuit test requires that "[there must be both (i) an explicit
threat or other action by the patentee, which creates a reasonable apprehension on
the part of the declaratory plaintiff that it will face an infringement suit, and (2)
present activity which could constitute infringement or concrete steps taken with the
intent to conduct such activity." 65 Part one of the test - which is commonly referred
to as the "reasonable apprehension" test - was held to incorporate the Supreme
Court's "all the circumstances" test.66 Part two of the test -referred to as the
"concrete steps" test - was incorporated by the Federal Circuit as a check on the
67
immediacy of the patent dispute at issue.

II. GENERAL DISCUSSION OF RULE 41(A)(2) AND REASONS FOR ITS IMPLEMENTATION
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were instituted as part of sweeping
reforms authorized by Congress 68 through the Rules Enabling Act of 1934.69 The Act
authorized the Supreme Court to promulgate rules of federal procedure.7 0 After
(3
(3

312 U.S. 270 (1941).

1-d. at 273.

61 See, e.g., BP Chems. Ltd. v. Union Carbide Corp., 4 F.3d 975, 978 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
(3 Id.; see also Sierra Applied Scis., Inc. v. Advanced Energy Indus., Inc., 363 F.3d 1361, 1373
(Fed. Cir. 2004) (applying the two-part justiciability test to determine whether an actual controversy
exists). This two-part test was recently overruled by the Supreme Court in Medlmmune, Inc. v.
Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007).
(3 Apotex, Inc. v. Pfizer Inc., 385 F. Supp. 2d 187, 191-92 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), affd, 159 F. App'x.
1013 (Fed. Cir. 2005); BP Chems. v. Union Carbide Corp., 4 F.3d 975, 978 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
(7 BP Chems., 4 F.3d 975 at 978.
G Laurens Walker, The End of the New Deal and the FederalRules of Civil Procedure, 82
IOWA L. REV. 1269, 1281 (1997). Both the passage of the Declaratory Judgment Act and the
implementation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure can be directly traced to New Deal reforms
instituted under President Franklin Roosevelt. Id.; see also William G. Ross, When Did the "Switch

In Time" Actually Occur?" Re -discovering the Supreme Court's "Forgotten"Decisions of 1936-1937,
37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1153 (2005) (providing historical context surrounding the Supreme Court's 1937
decisions involving federal legislation).
(39Act of June 19, 1934, ch. 651, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2006)).
70 28 U.S.C. § 2072; see also Lori A. Johnson, CreatingRules ofProcedurefor Federal Courts:

Administrative Prerogative or Legislative Policymaking, 24 JUST. Sys. J. 23 (2003) (providing an
overview of the process surrounding revisions of federal judicial practice and procedure); Walker,
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extensive consultation and deliberation, the reforms were instituted in 1938 with the
71
adoption of the FRCPs.
Calls for procedural reforms resulting in the FRCPs were most forcefully put
forth by the American Bar Association and were an attempt to bring the federal
courts under a unified set of rules.7 2 Prior to these reforms, federal courts generally
followed the practices and procedures of the forum state in which they sat pursuant
to the Practice Conformity Act of 1872. 73 Federal courts thus frequently followed
74
disjointed procedural rules based on common law or state statute.
Many variations abounded with regard to voluntary dismissal. Under common
law form pleading, a plaintiff could dismiss his case and refile it without leave of
court at any point in the proceeding before final judgment. 75 This was considered
necessary to permit a plaintiff to meet the form requirements for the court to grant
relief. Some courts allowed voluntary dismissal of a suit, without the court's
permission, anytime prior to final judgment, 76 while others limited the ability of a
plaintiff to dismiss the case until an answer 77 or summary judgment 78 had been filed,
and still others allowed voluntary dismissal anytime prior to final judgment, as long
as the opposing party would not be prejudiced. 79 In defining the FRCP regarding
voluntary dismissal, the Court had a very interesting array of procedural choices on
which to base the new federal rules.
The Supreme Court took the middle ground with the introduction of FRCP 41,80
81
allowing various forms of voluntary dismissal depending on the stage of the case.
FRCP 41(a)(1)(A)(i) allows a plaintiff to dismiss a case at any time prior to the
defendant's answer without permission of court.8 2 FRCP 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) allows for a

supra note 68, at 1281-82 (discussing changes to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure since
inception in 1934).
71Johnson, supra note 70, at 241; see also FED. R. Civ. P. 1 ("These rules govern the procedure
in all civil actions and proceedings in the United States district courts, except as stated in Rule 81.
They should be construed and administered to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action and proceeding.").
72 Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil
Proedure in tistorieal Perspetive, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 943-56 (1987) (reviewing the
circumstances surrounding the ABA's role in the formation of the Rules Enabling Act of 1934 and
the subsequent drafting of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
73 Act of June 1, 1872, ch. 255, § 5, 17 Stat. 196, 197; see Walker, supra note 68, at 1276-77.
71Michael E. Solimine & Amy E. Lippert, DeregulatingVoluntary Dismissals, 36 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 367, 372 (2003) (noting the advantage to the plaintiff of being able to abandon suit if the
matter was not going well).
75 Id. at 371-72.
76 Solimine, supra note 74, at 372.
77

Id

7SId. at 376.
7) Id. at 379; see also 9 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND

PROCEDURE § 2363, at 253 (2nd ed. 1994) (illustrating the differences between suits in equity
whereby "the plaintiff had a qualified right to dismiss at any time before an interlocutory or final
decree was entered unless the defendant could suffer some prejudice beyond the threat of another
suit").
80FED. R. CIv. P. 41.
81 Id.; Solimine, supra note 74, at 379.
82 FED. R. CIV. P. 41(a)(1)(A)(i) ('Subject to Rules 23(e), 23.1(c), 23.2, and 66 and any applicable
federal statute, the plaintiff may dismiss an action without a court order by filing ... a notice of
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dismissal upon stipulation by the parties at any point in the trial83 to promote the
settlement of litigation by the parties who, by negotiating fairly, can be counted on to
reach a more just result between them than a court can impose.8 4 As stated in FRCP
41(a)(1)(B), either of the subsections of FRCP 41(a)(1)(A) allow dismissals to be
"without prejudice" unless the dismissal order states otherwise.85 Under the present
rules, FRCP 41(a)(2) allows for dismissal upon leave of court at any juncture in the
proceeding, unless the defending party has filed counterclaims that remain
86
pending.
Of particular interest in relation to counterclaims is FRCP 41(a)(2)'s language,
from which two important restrictions can be gleaned. First, any proposed dismissal
is at the discretion of the court.8 7 Second, the text of FRCP 41(a)(2) states that "the
action may be dismissed over the defendant's objection only if the counterclaim can
88
remain pendingfor independentadjudication."

III. CASE REVIEW
The following review of cases impacted by Super Sack examines the tension that
exists between FRCP 41(a)(2) and the DJA in the face of a valid counterclaim
pending before the court-one that is capable of independent adjudication after a
plaintiff has done all in his power to withdraw all claims so as to divest the court of
jurisdiction. This review focuses specifically on the holding in Super Sack because it
is the Federal Circuit's first and strongest holding on this issue, and one that any
subsequent decision was required to follow or distinguish.
With the text and history of FRCP 41(a)(2) and the DJA in mind, this case
review first examines the relevant Supreme Court and Federal Circuit case law as it
existed prior to the Super Sack decision. The discussion looks to the circumstances
under which a case may be ready for adjudication under Article 11 and whether an
appellate court is obligated to review all issues in a patent case when both validity
and infringement claims are presented. The discussion focuses on the first prong of

dismissal before the opposing party serves either an answer or a motion for summary
judgment....").
83
J d. 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) ("Subject to Rules 23(e), 23.1(c), 23.2, and 66 and any applicable federal
statute, the plaintiff may dismiss an action without a court order by filing.., a stipulation of
dismissal signed by all parties who have appeared.").
84 Solimine, supra note 74, at 372-73.
85 FED. R. CIV. P. 41(a)(1)(B) ("Unless the notice or stipulation states otherwise, the dismissal is
without prejudice. But if the plaintiff previously dismissed any federal- or state-court action based
on or including the same claim, a notice of dismissal operates as an adjudication on the merits.").
86 FED. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2).
Except as provided in Rule 41(a)(1), an action may be dismissed at the
plaintiffs request only by court order, on terms that the court considers proper. If
a defendant has pleaded a counterclaim before being served with the plaintiffs
motion to dismiss, the action may be dismissed over the defendant's objection only
if the counterclaim can remain pending for independent adjudication. Unless the
order states otherwise, a dismissal under this paragraph (2) is without prejudice.

Id.

87 Jd
88 Id.

(emphasis added).
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the Federal Circuit's two-part justiciability test 89 (now overruled in Med/mmune) in
which a party must be under a "reasonable apprehension" of suit for the Court to
retain subject-matter jurisdiction. A detailed discussion of the relevant facts of
Super Sack is then presented to highlight the public policy issues underlying the
need for complete adjudication.
Finally, decisions citing Super Sack, favorably or unfavorably (including the
Supreme Court decision in Medimmune), are evaluated to examine whether the
precedent set forth in Super Sack remains viable precedent or whether the holding in
Super Sack needs to be explicitly overturned as no longer reflecting the current
status of the law. In this discussion, Med/mmune is viewed as a bookend to Super
Sack because in it, the Supreme Court redefined, and some would say lowered, the
justiciability requirement. A discussion of the effect of Medlmmune on recent
Federal Circuit decisions citing Super Sack is then presented as a tool to probe
whether Federal Circuit's case law regarding declaratory judgments has been
affected.

A. JusticiabilityofDeclaratoryJudgments Priorto Super Sack v. Chase
Case law regarding declaratory judgment jurisdiction as it existed prior to the
decision of Super Sack was in a period of change. 90 The Federal Circuit had decided
several cases in the years prior to Super Sack but, for the most part, the decisions
were fact intensive and were made based on a number of criteria that the courts
identified as being material to the issues.91 At issue was the Court's jurisdiction over
cases that had been decided or settled on one of the two major issues in patent
litigation, that is, infringement and patent validity/unenforceability, and whether
courts are obligated to rule on the other issues to establish a complete record for
review. 92 The most significant of these pre-Super Sack cases are discussed below.
Declaratory judgment cases regarding patents tend to share one of two fact
patterns: (1) either a plaintiff sues for patent infringement ("Infringement First
case") to which the defendant counterclaims for a declaratory judgment of noninfringement, invalidity, and/or unenforceability 93 or, (2) the plaintiff seeks a
declaratory judgment ("DJA First case") of non-infringement, invalidity, and/or

89See BP Chems. Ltd. v. Union Carbide Corp., 4 F.3d 975, 978 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
90 Lisa A Dolak, Power or Prudence: Toward a Better Standard for Evaluating Patent
Litigants' Access to the Declaratory Judgment Remedy, 41 U.S.F. L. REV. 407, 414-15 (2007)

(describing the evolution of "reasonable apprehension of liability" from a fear to an "explicit threat"
to an "express charge").
91See, e.g., Vieau v. Japax, Inc., 823 F.2d 1510 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Fonar Corp. v. Johnson &
Johnson, 821 F.2d 627 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
92See Cardinal Chem. Co. v. Morton Int'l, Inc., 508 U.S. 83, 98 (1993) (considering the Federal
Circuit's use of the principle of mootness).
93 See, e.g., Fort James Corp. v. Solo Cup Co., 412 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Intellectual Prop.
Dev., Inc. v. TCI Cablevision of Calif., Inc., 248 F.3d 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Inline Connection Corp.
v. Atlantech Online, Inc., 85 F. App'x. 767 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
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unenforceability, after which the patent holder counterclaims for patent
94
infringement.
As relating to the present review of these two types of cases, the main difference
is that in an Infringement First case, the defendant need not initially worry that the
case will be dismissed due to lack of subject-matter jurisdiction because the
reasonable apprehension of a suit does not exist; the patent holder's present lawsuit
necessarily establishes subject-matter jurisdiction at the inception of the case
without further need to satisfy the requirements of the DJA, so declaratory judgment
jurisdiction is not at issue. These Infringement First cases are discussed herein as
later acts in which the plaintiff-patent owner may remove the jurisdiction of the
court, for example, by providing a covenant not to sue, after a declaratory judgment
claim of non-infringement or invalidity has been pleaded. On the other hand, in a
DJA First case, often the first issue the court will take up is whether the facts
leading up to the filing of the action has established sufficient grounds to retain
subject-matter jurisdiction.

1. Arrowhead and the ReasonableApprehension Test
One of the most cited DJA First cases decided by the Federal Circuit, Arrowhead
Industrial Water, Inc., v. Ecolochem, Inc.,95 sought to define whether the acts of a
DJA defendant were sufficient to place an accused infringer under apprehension of
suit thereby satisfying the DJA's justiciability requirement.
Prior to the
commencement of the DJA action, several acts by the defendant were viewed by the
DJA plaintiff as placing it under a sufficient threat of infringement from which to
96
bring the DJA action.
The district court granted defendant's motion to dismiss the suit for lack of
jurisdiction for want of an actual controversy. 97 The court held that "[plaintiff] has
not even alleged its process is identical to [defendant's] process and it certainly has
not shown the process is the same. In the absence of such evidence, the court cannot
98
conclude an apprehension of a patent infringement action is imminent."
The Federal Circuit, on appeal, was unpersuaded by the district court's
reasoning. 99 It began its analysis by stating the reasoning behind the DJA and its

94 See, e.g., BP Chems. Ltd. v. Union Carbide Corp., 4 F.3d 975 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Caraco Pharm.
Labs., Ltd. v. Forest Labs., Inc., 527 F.3d 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Fina Research, S.A. v. Baroid Ltd.,
141 F.3d 1479 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
95, 846 F.2d 731 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
96 Id. at 737. The defendant (1) sent letters to two of the plaintiffs customers stating that the
plaintiff was not licensed to use the defendant's products and, as such, the customers could be held
as direct infringers, (2) sent a letter from defendant's counsel stating that it "has reason to believe
that [plaintiff] is contemplating or has initiated the practice of the patented process" and that
defendant "has in the past not hesitated to protect its patent rights whenever appropriate," and (3)
named the DJA plaintiff as an infringer in a suit between the defendant and a third party. Id.
97 Arrowhead Indus. Water, Inc. v. Ecolochem, Inc., 5 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1895, 1898 (N.D. Ill.
1987),98rev'd846 F.2d 731 (Fed. Cir. 1988); see Arrowhead,846 F.2d at 734.
Arrowhead,5 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1898; see Arrowhead,846 F.2d at 733-34.
99 Arrowhead,846 F.2d at 735.
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implications to patent law. 100 The language of the introduction bears repeating in its
entirety as it is often quoted in Federal Circuit decisions to this day:
This appeal presents a type of the sad and saddening scenario that led to
enactment of the Declaratory Judgment Act (Act), 28 U.S.C. § 2201. In the
patent version of that scenario, a patent owner engages in a danse macabre,
brandishing a Damoclean threat with a sheathed sword. Guerrilla-like, the
patent owner attempts extra-judicial patent enforcement with scare-thecustomer-and-run tactics that infect the competitive environment of the
business community with uncertainty and insecurity. Before the Act,
competitors victimized by that tactic were rendered helpless and immobile
so long as the patent owner refused to grasp the nettle and sue. After the
Act, those competitors were no longer restricted to an in terrorem choice
between the incurrence of a growing potential liability for patent
infringement and abandonment of their enterprises; they could clear the air
by suing for a judgment that would settle the conflict of interests. The sole
requirement for jurisdiction under the Act is that the conflict be real and
immediate, i.e., that there be a true, actual "controversy" required by the
101
Act.
Taking the relevant conduct of both the plaintiff and the defendant into account,
the Federal Circuit found that the plaintiff was indeed under a reasonable
apprehension of an infringement suit. 10 2 The defendant had both the willingness (as
evidenced by the letters) and the capacity (as evidenced by its suit of the third party)
to engage in litigation to protect its patent rights. 103 No businessperson, the Federal
Circuit noted, would fail to be under a reasonable apprehension of an infringement
10 4
suit when faced with this array of facts before him.
Additionally, the court disagreed with the district court's reasoning on several
counts.1 05 First, it noted that a requirement that the letter specifically charge
infringement would eviscerate the requirement that the court look to "all the
circumstances" to determine reasonable apprehension. 10 6 If one is directly charged
with infringement (an Infringement First action) there is no apprehension of suit;
there is a suit. Second, the evidence presented in the third party suit indicates that
the defendant made a reasoned and considered evaluation of the facts when it listed
the plaintiff as an infringer. 10 7 Further, the Federal Circuit found incongruous the
district court's requirement that the plaintiff prove its product is the same as the
defendant's in order for the Court to retain jurisdiction, as this would require that
the plaintiff admit infringement prior to proving non-infringement. 108

100 Id. at 736.

101 Id.
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 Id.
105 Id.
106 Id.
107 Id.
108

Id.

at
at
at
at
at
at
at

734-35 (citations omitted).
738.
736.
737.
738.
737.
738.
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Spectronics and ContinuingJurisdiction

In Speetronies Corp. v. H.B. Fuller Co., 10 9 the Federal Circuit set out the
groundwork for determining the extent to which jurisdiction must be maintained
during a trial. In Speetronies, a DJA First action, the DJA defendant and patent
holder issued a letter to those in its industry announcing the issuance of its patent
and extolling the development of its "patent family" of products. 110 After the DJA
action commenced, the DJA defendant filed several motions to dismiss for lack of an
actual controversy, the last motion incorporating a "Statement of Non-Liability." 111
Upon this motion, the district court dismissed the case for lack of subject-matter
112
j urisdiction.
On appeal to the Federal Circuit, the DJA plaintiff argued that the district
court's dismissal was improper because subject-matter jurisdiction is established at
113
the time of pleading based only on the facts existing at the time of the pleading.
This was unpersuasive; while it is true that jurisdiction cannot be established where
114
none originally existed, it also must be maintained throughout all stages of a case.
The power to hear a case under Article III, and by implication whether the DJA was
proper, requires that a case or controversy exist at all stages of a case. 115 Thus the
district court was correct in taking into account post-filing events in determining that
it was divested of a "case or controversy" when the DJA defendant issued its
statement of non-liability. 116 The viability and content of any future patent based on
the potentially reissued claims was found to be too speculative to establish a
117
sufficient case or controversy for a court to retain jurisdiction.

3. Cardinal Chemical and the Mootness Doctrine
In Cardinal Chemical Co. v. Morton International,Inc., 118 the Supreme Court
reviewed the Federal Circuit's mootness jurisprudence to determine whether an
affirmance by the Federal Circuit of non-infringement is a sufficient reason for
vacating a DJA holding of patent invalidity. The question put forth in Cardinal
Chemical arose from two related cases in which the Federal Circuit invoked its so

109
940 F.2d 631 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
110 Id.at 632.
111 Id. at 633. In the "Statement of Non-Liability," the DJA defendant indicated that it recently
filed a reissue application with the Unites States Patent & Trademark Office canceling the claims
on which the suit was originally brought. Id
112 Id.

11"
Id.at 634.

Id. at 635; see also Super Sack Mfg. Corp. v. Chase Packaging Corp., 57 F.3d 1054, 1060
(Fed. Cir. 1995) (upholding divestiture of subject matter jurisdiction once a covenant not to sue
rendered present acts of infringement irrelevant).
115 Spectronis, 940 F.2d at 635; see also Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395, 401 (1975) (noting
that Article III of the Constitution requires that a real and substantial controversy exists for the
exercise of judicial power to be).
116 Spectronies, 940 F.2d at 636.
117 Id. at 638.
118 508 U.S. 83 (1993).
114
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called "mootness doctrine."1 19 In each of the cases, the plaintiff sued the defendant
for infringement to which the defendant counterclaimed for non-infringement and
invalidity.120 A judgment of non-infringement and invalidity was found in each of
these cases. 121
On appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed the finding of noninfringement after which it vacated the district court's finding of invalidity as being
moot: "since we have affirmed the district court's holding that the patents at issue
have not been infringed, we need not address the question of validity. Accordingly,
we vacate the holding of invalidity."' 122 Thus, even though the district court entered a
judgment of invalidity for the patent-in-suit, the Federal Circuit never expressly
overruled the finding and the patent was later reasserted against a different
123
defendant.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the Federal
Circuit's matter of course practice of vacating judgments of invalidity after a noninfringement finding comported with the requirements of full and complete
adjudication. 124 The Federal Circuit, the Supreme Court noted, felt confined to the
mootness doctrine by two prior Supreme Court cases, 125 ElectricalFittings Corp. v.
Thomas & Betts Co. 126 and Altvater v. Freeman.127 Applying the perceived holdings
of those cases, the Federal Circuit decided several cases in which it determined that a
finding of non-infringement negated the "case or controversy" requirement of the
DJA and, thus, eliminated the need to decide issues of invalidity or unenforceability
1 28
when the court was convinced that the "case or controversy" was resolved.
The Supreme Court held that the Federal Circuit retains sufficient subjectmatter jurisdiction to consider invalidity even in the face of a finding of noninfringement. 129 That jurisdiction, however, is discretionary. 13 0
There are two
independent bases for this jurisdiction. First, the Federal Circuit is not the court of
119 Id. at 89-90; see Vieau v. Japax, Inc., 823 F.2d 1510, 1517 (Fed. Cir. 1987); see Fonar Corp.
v. Johnson & Johnson, 821 F.2d 627, 634 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
120 CardinalChem, 508 U.S. at 89-90; see Vieau, 823 F.2d at 1513; see Fonar Corp., 821 F.2d
at 630.
121 CardinalChem, 508 U.S. at 89-90; see Veau, 823 F.2d at 1513; see Fonar Corp., 821 F.2d
at 630.
122 Morton Int'l, Inc. v. Cardinal Chem. Co., 959 F.2d 948, 952 (Fed. Cir. 1992); see Cardinal
Chem., 508 U.S. at 87.
123 CardinalChem., 508 U.S. at 88; see CardinalChem., 959 F.2d at 952.
124 CardinalChem., 508 U.S. at 85.
125 Id. at 92.
126 307 U.S. 241 (1939).
127 319 U.S. 359 (1943) (holding a patent valid if it is not infringed is to decide a hypothetical
case as opposed to the situation where the counterclaim is directed to additional patent claims not
involved in the complaint at issue, in which case the invalidity claim is not moot).
128 CardinalChem., 508 U.S. at 91-92.
129 Id. at 96. This oft quoted and typically misapplied language states that:
It is equally clear that the Federal Circuit, even after affirming the finding
of non-infringement, had jurisdietion to consider Morton's appeal from the
declaratory judgment of invalidity. A party seeking a declaratory judgment of
invalidity presents a claim independent of the patentee's charge of infringement.
If the District Court has jurisdiction (established independently from its
jurisdiction over the patentee's charge of infringement) to consider that claim, so
does (barring any intervening events) the Federal Circuit.
Id.
130

Id.
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last resort and therefore procedural processes and appellate status must be complete
for a ruling to be reviewed by an appellate tribunal.13 1
Second, jurisdiction
established at the time of filing is presumed to be retained and will only be revoked if
subsequent events are brought forward by the party opposing jurisdiction. 132
Applying the jurisdictional amalgam to the facts of Cardinal Chemical, the
Court found that "Ieiven if it may be good practice to decide no more than is
necessary to determine an appeal, it is clear that the Federal Circuit had jurisdiction
to review the

declaratory

judgment of invalidity."' 133

Jurisdiction

is thus

a

discretionary matter confined to the facts of each case and a per se rule which fails to
take into account the individual facts of a given case is not sufficient to satisfy the
case or controversy requirement of Article III or Supreme Court precedent. The
Supreme Court holding was subsequently understood by the Federal Circuit to mean
that "a finding of non-infringement does not moot invalidity or unenforceability
134
defenses when they are raised in a counterclaim."

4. BP Chemicals and the Clarificationof ReasonableApprehension
In BP Chemicals Ltd. v. Union Carbide Corp.,1

35

the Federal Circuit was called

upon to distinguish the difference between actions that create a reasonable
apprehension of suit and actions that are merely the competitive use of patented
technology as a marketing tool. 136 Here, the plaintiff in a DJA First case brought
suit for non-infringement of the defendant's patent. 137 The DJA plaintiff attempted
to establish jurisdiction sufficient to satisfy the DJA by arguing that the DJA
defendant, in marketing its product, continually referenced its patented technology to
prospective purchasers. 138 Additionally, the DJA plaintiff argued that in order to
effectively sell its product, its customers required that it indemnify them against
potential infringement suits by the DJA defendant. 139 No evidence was presented
that the DJA defendant threatened to sue the DJA plaintiff or its customers for
140
patent infringement.
After an evidentiary hearing on the question of jurisdiction, the district court
dismissed the DJA suit.1 4 1
It found that the DJA plaintiff was not under a
reasonable apprehension of suit sufficient to imbue jurisdiction upon the court. 142 On
appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed. 143 It noted that the purpose of the DJA was "to
enable a person who is reasonably at legal risk because of an unresolved dispute to

132

Id. at 97.
Id. at 98.

133

Id.

134

Fin Control Sys. Pty, Ltd. v. OAM, Inc., 265 F.3d 1311, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
975 (Fed. Cir. 1993).

131

1:354 F.3d
136

Id. at 980.

137

Id. at 976.

138
139
140

Id. at 979.
Id. at 981.
Id. at 980.

141 BP Chems. v. Union Carbide Corp., 757 F. Supp. 303, 310 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), affd, 4 F.3d 975
(Fed. Cir. 1993).
142

Id.

143

BP Chems., 4 F.3d at 981.
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obtain judicial resolution of that dispute without having to await the commencement
'
of legal action by the other side. 144
With this in mind, the Federal Circuit demurred to the district court's
evaluation of witnesses presented by both sides. 145 The Federal Circuit ruled that
the district court did not err in finding that the DJA defendant's claims of patented
technology were an effective marketing strategy. 146 Direct threats of infringement
are not required to satisfy the jurisdictional requirements of the DJA, and indirect
threats creating a reasonable apprehension of suit will satisfy the same
requirements. 147 The Federal Circuit found that the DJA defendant's actions did not
rise to that level. 148 Additionally, the argument that the lack of a clear promise by
the DJA defendant in a covenant not to sue once litigation commenced, acts as a de
149
facto cause of a reasonable apprehension of suit also failed to persuade the court.
In conclusion, the Federal Circuit noted that the line of demarcation between the
creation of a reasonable apprehension of suit and the inhibition of unauthorized use
150
of patented subject matter is a fine one, but it was not breached in this case.

B. Super Sack v. Chase
Against the backdrop of these case holdings, Super Sack was decided first by the
152
district court, 151 and then by the Federal Circuit.
Over a period of several years, Super Sack filed patent infringement actions
against Chase and a multitude of defendants 153 along the way also filing an

Id. at
at
146 Id.at
147 Id. at
18 Id.at
144

115Id.

149

Id.

150

d.

151Super

977.
978-80.
981.
979.
980.

Sack Mfg. Corp. v. Chase Packaging Corp., No. 3:88CV1963P, 1995 WL 813691
(N.D. Tex. Oct. 17, 1995).
152 Super Sack Mfg. Corp. v. Chase Packaging Corp., 57 F.3d 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
53 Corrected Brief for Appellant-Defendant Chase Packaging Corp. ix-xii, Super Sack, 57 F.3d
1054 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (No. 95-1001) [hereinafter Chase Brief], available at 1994 WL 16015218; see,
e.g., Super Sack Mfg. Corp. v. Transac Inc., No. 4:92-CV-00120-PNB (E.D. Tex. dismissed Nov. 17,
1994); Super Sack Mfg. Corp. v. Bulk-Lift Int'l, Inc., No. 4:92-CV-00077-PNB (E.D. Tex. dismissed
Aug. 11, 1994); Super Sack Mfg. Corp. v. Stone Container Corp., No. 3:92-CV-00769-D (N.D. Tex.
dismissed Mar. 30, 1994); Super Sack Mfg. Corp. v. Atlas Bag Inc., No. 4:92CV01753 (S.D. Tex.
dismissed Dec. 27, 1993); Super Sack Mfg. Corp. v. Langston Cos., No. 4:92CV00275A (N.D. Tex.
dismissed July 30, 1993), appeal dismissedper stipulation,16 F.3d 419 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Super Sack
Mfg. Corp. v. Augusta Bag Co., No. CV 190-187, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19998 (S.D. Ga. October 21,
1992); Super Sack Mfg. Corp. v. U.S. Sack Corp., No. 4:92CV01754 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 4, 1992)
(consolidating case with case number 4:92CV01753); Super Sack Mfg. Corp. v. FlexCon & Sys. Inc.,
No. 3:92-CV-01135-R (N.D. Tex. filed June 4, 1992); Super Sack Mfg. Corp. v. Bulk-Pack, Inc., No.
4:90-CV-00171-PNB, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22500 (E.D. Tex. April 6, 1992); Super Sack Mfg. v.
Bancroft Bag, Inc., No. 4:91-CV-00077-PNB (E.D. Tex. Aug. 2, 1991) (consolidating case with case
number 4:90-CV-00171-PNB); Super Sack Mfg. Corp. v. Cajun Bag & Supply Co., No. 6:90-CV01288-TS-RSP (W.D. La. dismissed Apr. 16, 1991).
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154
International Trade Commission ("ITC") action against several respondents,
accusing essentially all of Super Sack's competitors in the bulk bag industry of
infringement of their patents. The Super Sack v. Chase suit, brought in 1988,
asserted infringement of two U.S. patents. 155 The same patents were also asserted
against the other defendants in both the infringement actions and the ITC action. 156
Of the remaining infringement actions, only three are reported as having been
adjudicated in addition to Super Sack v. ChsSe.157 The first to be adjudicated was
Super Sack Manufacturing Corp. v. Bulk-Paek, Inc., 158 which went to trial and
resulted in a finding in favor of Super Sack for both infringement and validity of both
patents in suit. 159 This case was not appealed and Super Sack then avidly pursued
its other cases against the remaining defendants. Next, Super Sack Manufacturing
Corp. v. Augusta Bag Co., 160 went to trial, but turned out differently, ending with a
finding of non-infringement.1 61 Finally, Super Sack ManufacturingCorp. v. Langston
Cos., 162 is reported as a table decision by the Federal Circuit, dismissing the district
court's findings of non-infringement.1 63 All of the other infringement actions were
either settled or dismissed following the filing of the motion to add an inequitable
conduct count in Super Sack v. Chase.164 The ITC action against five respondents
was apparently settled without opinion of the ITC against all respondents, but the
assumed settlement agreement prohibited the respondents from disclosing its

terms. 165

In Super Sack v. Chase, after Super Sack sued Chase for infringement of Super
Sack's patents, Chase counterclaimed for declaratory judgment of non-infringement

154

See In re Certain Bulk Bags and Process for Making Same, Inv. No. 337-TA-338 (June

1992), available at 1992 ITC LEXIS 332.
155 SuperSack,57 F.3d at 1055; U.S. Patent No. 4,194,652 (filed Oct. 30, 1978) (issued Mar. 25,
1980); U.S. Patent No. 4,143,796 (filed July 7, 1977) (issued Mar. 13, 1979).
156 See id. at 1056.
157 See Chase Brief, supra note 153, at x-xi.
158 No. 4:90-CV-00171-PNB, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22500 (E.D. Tex. April 6, 1992)
159 Id.; see Chase Brief, supra note 153, at x (noting that the parties entered into a settlement
agreement after trial).
160 No. CV 190-187, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19998 (S.D. Ga. October 21, 1992).
16 Id. at *35; see Chase Brief, supra note 153, at ix.
162 16 F.3d 419 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
163 Jd.; see Chase Brief, supra note 153, at ix-x.
161 Super Sack Mfg. Corp. v. Chase Packaging Corp., 57 F.3d 1054, 1055 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
105 See In re Certain Bulk Bags and Process for Making Same, Inv. No. 337-TA-338 (Feb.
1993), available at 1993 ITC LEXIS 102 (providing the notice of commission determination
terminating investigation in its entirety); In re Certain Bulk Bags and Process for Making Same,
Inv. No. 337-TA-338 (Jan. 1993), available at 1993 ITC LEXIS 69 (providing the notice of initial
determination terminating respondent on the basis of settlement agreement); In re Certain Bulk
Bags and Process for Making Same, Inv. No. 337-TA-338 (Jan. 1993), available at 1993 ITC LEXIS
68 (providing "[t]here has been a mutually agreeable settlement, the terms of which require
confidentiality"); In -r Certain Bulk Bags and Process for Making Same, Inv. No. 337-TA-338 (Dec.
1992), available at 1992 ITC LEXIS 769 (providing the notice of initial determination terminating
respondent on the basis of settlement agreement); In -r Certain Bulk Bags and Process for Making
Same, Inv. No. 337-TA-338 (Dec. 1992), available at 1992 ITC LEXIS 737 (providing the notice of
initial determination terminating respondent on the basis of settlement agreement).
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and invalidity. 166 After discovery, Chase filed its first summary judgment motion for
167
non-infringement, which was denied.
After a long period of inactivity, Chase renewed its motion for summary
judgment for non-infringement, invalidity, and added a new issue of unenforceability
not alleged in its answer or in its first summary judgment motion.1 68 This second
summary judgment motion was the first time the unenforceability issue had been
raised and recited a claim of inequitable conduct during prosecution of the patent
applications that matured into the patents in suit.1 69 This renewed motion for
170
summary judgment was never ruled upon by the district court.
After another period of inactivity, the court directed the parties to confer
regarding Super Sack's indications that it no longer wished to continue its
infringement claims against Chase, 171 but whether this resulted from Chase's
assertions of inequitable conduct is unclear. The implication was that Super Sack
would remove its claim of infringement if Chase agreed to retract its claim of
inequitable conduct.1 7 2 Chase did not agree to this and filed a motion to amend its
answer and add counterclaims to include a count of unenforceability due to
17 3
inequitable conduct.
Super Sack thereafter filed a "Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction or, In
the Alternative, Plaintiffs Motion to Dismiss by Order of this Court," citing both
FRCP 12(b)(1) and FRCP 41(a)(2).174 In this motion, Super Sack's counsel stated that
"Super Sack will unconditionally agree not to sue Chase for infringement as to any
claim of the patents-in-suit based upon the products currently manufactured and
sold by Chase." 175 Of note, the statement of non-infringement did not absolve Chase
from any liability for future acts of infringement on any future products Chase may
176
develop if the motion was granted.
The district court granted Super Sack's motion to dismiss and dismissed the case
with prejudice. 177 The court never stated upon which grounds it granted the motion
under FRCP 12(b)(1) or FRCP 41(a)(2); rather, it simply granted the motion to
dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. 178 On appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed the
dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, holding:
Because Chase can have no reasonable apprehension that it will face an
infringement suit on the '796 and '652 patents with respect to past and
present products, it fails to satisfy the first part of our two-part test of
justiciability.

1'6SuperSack, 57 F.3d at 1055.
167

Id.

168 Id. at 1056.
169

Id.

170 Id.
171

Id.

172
Id.

Id.
Id.
175 Id.
176 Id. at 1057.
177 Id. at 1055.
173
174

178 Id.at 1061.
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...Chase has, of course, never contended that it has already taken
meaningful preparatory steps toward an infringing activity by planning to
make a new product that may later be said to infringe.... The residual
possibility of a future infringement suit based on Chase's future acts is
simply too speculative a basis for jurisdiction over Chase's counterclaim for
declaratory judgments of invalidity. The only proper course for the trial
179
court was to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction, as it did.
The Federal Circuit did not address the issue of whether the district court
properly or improperly granted the mandate of FRCP 41(a)(2) in the face of the
remaining motions and counterclaims that were capable of independent
adjudication.18 0 The Federal Circuit noted in a mere footnote that it "review[s]
judgments, not opinions" and as such, it "'need not close [its] eyes to the record
1 81
where, as in this case, there is a way clearly open to affirm' the trial court's action."
Chase cited Cardinal Chemical 82 for the proposition that "a party seeking a
declaratory judgment of invalidity presents a claim independent of the patentee's
charge of infringement."'1 83 The Super Sack court found that, in accordance with the
Supreme Court's CardinalChemical decision, the district court had no discretion over
whether to decide to retain jurisdiction to consider invalidity even in the face of a
184
patent owner essentially admitting non-infringement.
Super Sack's counsel's oral promise not to sue was apparently enough, however,
to satisfy the Federal Circuit that there no longer remained a "reasonable
apprehension" of suit. 185 Neither the district court nor the Federal Circuit ever noted

that Super Sack had also filed lawsuits against virtually every competitor in the
industry. Of these actions, two had already gone to trial, and the industry was in
turmoil because one of the actions was concluded with a finding of patent validity
and infringement.1 86 The ITC actions against five respondents were settled (no ITC
final ruling ever issued) before the district court dismissed the Super Sack case, and
the remaining pending court cases were all settled following the disclosure of
18 7
inequitable conduct in the Super Sack district court action.

179Id. at

1059-60.

180Id. at 1057.
181
Id.at 1057 n.2.
182 Cardinal

Chem. Co. v. Morton Int'l, Inc., 508 U.S. 83 (1993).
SupeorSack, 57 F.3d at 1060 (quoting Ca-rdinalChem., 508 U.S. at 96).
18 Id. ("[T]he trial court did not err in concluding that post-filing events rendered moot the
controversy in this case.").
185Id. at 1059.
186 Super Sack Mfg. Corp. v. Chase Packaging Corp., No. 3:88CV1963P, 1995 WL 813691
(N.D. Texas Oct. 17, 1995).
187 C. Chase Brief, supra note 153, at ix-xii (noting all other defendants had settled prior to
the appeal by Chase).
183
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C. CasesFollowing Super Sack, Pre-Medlmmune
Each of the cases discussed in this section is presented chronologically starting
from the Super Sack decision of 1995 and extending to the Supreme Court's 2007
188
decision in Medlmmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc.
In Mobile Oil Corp. v. Advanced EnvironmentalRecycling Technologies, Inc.,18 9 a
DJA First case, the Federal Circuit looked to whether the failure of a declaratory
judgment defendant to counterclaim for infringement divests the court of subjectmatter jurisdiction. The court found that a DJA defendant's refusal to counterclaim
for infringement removes any apprehension of suit from the DJA plaintiff because
infringement in such a case is a mandatory counterclaim. 190 The court lacked
subject-matter jurisdiction to rule on the remaining DJA claims of unenforceability
and invalidity because the DJA defendant-patent owner issued a de facto admission
of non-infringement. 191 The Federal Circuit held that absence of a reasonable
apprehension of suit for infringement divested the district court of subject-matter
jurisdiction.192
Thus, the court was forced to overrule the jury findings of
unenforceability and invalidity of the patents at issue because subject-matter
jurisdiction enabling justiciability under Article III must be maintained throughout
193
at all stages of a legal action, including appeals.
In a reversal of roles from those in Mobile Oil, the Federal Circuit, in LambWeston, Inc. v. McCain Foods, Ltd.,194 looked to whether a finding of noninfringement due to invalidity renders moot counterclaims of unenforceability. The
Federal Circuit, citing the Supreme Court's opinion in Cardinal Chemical, found it
did.195 The finding of invalidity, the Court said, mooted the need for a ruling on the
claim of unenforceability; because the patents were invalid and no future party could
be accused of patent infringement, the court need not rule on the unenforceability
issue, as it was redundant. 196 This ruling mirrored the Federal Circuit's "mootness
doctrine," whereby the court will decline to hear claims of unenforceability and
invalidity in the face of a holding of non-infringement.197
127 S. Ct. 764 (2007).
No. 95-1333, 1996 WL 325081 (Fed.Cir. June 13 1996) (appearing as a table decision at 92
F.3d 1203).
190 Id.at *3.
188
189

191 Id.
192 Id.
194

Id.
78 F.3d 540 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (per curiam).

195

Id. at 545-46.

193

196
Id.at 546.
197 Id. The reasoning used in Lamb-Weston is interesting. The court noted that it declined to
address the issue of unenforceability because the patent in question was found to be invalid, thus
sparing any future parties threats of infringement. Id. at 546. Using the same rationale, an
infringement suit in which the infringement issue was not reached should be allowed to reach the
issue of unenforceability in order to fully litigate the matter before the court and spare future third
parties the threat of litigation for infringement based on patents that may be unenforceable. This
was also the case in Super Sack, where claims of unenforceability and invalidity were still before the
court. Though the defendant in Super Sack was no longer in apprehension of an infringement suit,
the counterclaim of invalidity and a motion to add unenforceability to the counterclaim were before
the Court and were ripe for adjudication. Future parties would thus be spared threats of
infringement if Super Sack's patents were indeed found to be invalid or unenforceable. These issues
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In a DJA First case, the court in In re Yamaha Motor Co.,198 addressed whether
a promise not to sue for past and future infringement would vacate liability for
contributory infringement on the part of the DJA plaintiffs customers. Similar to
Super Sack, the DJA defendant issued a promise not to sue for past or future acts of
purported infringement. 199 The DJA plaintiff, in an attempt to convince the court to
retain jurisdiction over the patent invalidity claim, asserted the possibility of further
patent suits against its customers. 20 0 The district court found that the first part of
the justiciability test was satisfied because the DJA plaintiffs customers were still
liable for contributory infringement. 201 On a writ of mandamus, the Federal Circuit
found that any apprehension of suit was discharged with regard to the DJA plaintiff
by the promise

not to sue. 20 2

It

was also determined

that the reasonable

apprehension test could not be extended to the DJA plaintiffs customers because
20
they were not parties to the suit.

3

Fina Research, S.A. v. Baroid Ltd.,20 4 a DJA First case, looked to whether a
promise not to sue divested a DJA plaintiff of indirect infringement liability. The
district court held that even though Fina received two letters - one accusing it of
direct infringement and the other of indirect or contributory infringement - the
plaintiff was no longer under reasonable apprehension of suit because the patent
owner's counsel later disavowed both letters in a third letter stating that its client
(Baroid) "has not and does not make any claim of infringement against [Final.205
20 6
Specifically distinguishing the case from Super Sack, the Federal Circuit reversed.
The first two letters resulted in a reasonable apprehension sufficient to satisfy the
justiciability test, while the third letter did not unequivocally provide the necessary
covenant not to sue for all past and present products, as had been made in both the
20 7
Super Sack and Spectronies cases.
Another case, Amana Refrigeration, Inc. v. Quadlux, Inc.,208 a DJA First case,
looked to whether a covenant not to sue was sufficient to remove any reasonable
apprehension of suit for products that were in development at the time the covenant
was issued. The district court found that it did. 209 The Federal Circuit affirmed the
holding, noting that subject-matter jurisdiction for products that are not in current
2 10
production is too speculative even in the face of assertions of possible infringement.
As for current products, the issuance of a covenant not to sue forever estops the

were properly before the court and, but for plaintiffs lack of action, would have been fully
adjudicated.
198 No. Misc. 518, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 26595 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (appearing as a table decision
at 124 F.3d 228).
199 Id.at *6.
200 Id. at *7.
201
202

Id.
Id.

2 3 Id.

204 141 F.3d 1479 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
205
206
207
208

Id.at 1483.
Id. at 1484.
Id.at 1483-84.
172 F.3d 852 (Fed. Cir. 1999).

209

Id. at 855.

210

Id.at 856.
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issuing party from asserting infringement liability over those products that the
211
covenant covers.
2 12
IntellectualPropertyDevelopment, Inc. v. PCI Cablevision of California,Inc.,
an Infringement First case, looked to whether voluntary dismissal via a "Statement
of Non-Liability" fully divested a defendant of all infringement liability concerns most notably indemnity and direct liability of potential transferees. The district
court held it did and the Federal Circuit agreed in an opinion extending the effect of
a covenant not to sue to a "Statement of Non-Liability."213 The Federal Circuit found
also that the Statement could remove any "reasonable apprehension" of an
infringement suit brought by the patent owner, but one issue left open was whether
such a suit could be brought by the patent owner's subsidiaries and successors in
interest. 214 The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the patent
infringement action with prejudice, and the declaratory judgment counterclaims
without prejudice, pending the counterclaimant's ability to properly plead that the
court had subject matter jurisdiction. 215 The court found, as a distinguishing feature,
that a reasonable apprehension existed with the possibility of a patent infringement
lawsuit brought by the patent owner's putative exclusive licensee. 216 While that
particular allegation was not pleaded in the counterclaim, the rights conferred by the
license were not clear and the court allowed for the possibility of the defendant being
able to plead that the Statement did not remove the risk of a lawsuit by the
licensee. 217 However, the "Statement of Non-liability" was considered sufficient to
remove any reasonable apprehension of a suit from the parties as they currently
218
stood.
In an Infringement First case, Inline Connection Corp. v. Atlanteeh Online,
Inc., 219 the Federal Circuit decided whether a district court retained sufficient subject
matter jurisdiction to issue a permanent injunction after a covenant not to sue had
been submitted by the patent owner. The Federal Circuit, in a non-precedential
opinion, found the district court's retention of subject-matter jurisdiction and
issuance of a permanent injunction to be an abuse of discretion. 220 Vacating the
district court's injunction, the Federal Circuit followed the Super Sack precedent in
finding that the district court was divested of subject-matter jurisdiction as soon as
the covenant was submitted and, therefore, the district court lacked jurisdiction to
issue an injunction thereafter. 221 Answering a mirror image of the question left open
in IntelleetualPropertyDevelopment, the Federal Circuit ruled that the covenant not
222
to sue was personal in nature, and therefore applicable against the defendant only.

211 Id.
212 248

F.3d 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
1341.
214 Id.at 1341-42.
215 Id. at 1342.
216 Id.at 1341-42.
217 Id.
218 Id. at 1341.
219 85 F. App'x 767 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
220 Id. at 769.
21:3Id.at

221

Id.

222

Id.
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A lawsuit that could be brought against the asserted patent infringer's successors in
223
interest was deemed too speculative to rule on by the Federal Circuit.

Sierra Applied Sciences, Inc. v. Advanced Energy Industries, Inc.,224 is a DJA
First case in which the issue on appeal was whether a promise not to sue, specifically
limited to current in-house testing, was sufficient to remove the DJA plaintiffs
reasonable apprehension of suit for past in-house use as well as for future products.
The district court held that the patent owner's covenant not to sue for any current inhouse testing of purportedly infringing products was sufficient to remove this
apprehension and divested the court of subject-matter jurisdiction. 225 The Federal
Circuit found that though the promise was deficient to divest the court of subjectmatter jurisdiction, because it removed the apprehension from a portion of the
purported infringing activity for current in-house testing, it did not remove
apprehension from past testing activities nor from products which were previously
sold or could be sold in the near future. 226 Of note, the Federal Circuit stated that
the reasonable apprehension test is an ephemeral one; though it may exist at a
certain point, the passage of time may diminish it so as to remove apprehension from
227
a potential infringer.
The Federal Circuit took the opportunity to elaborate on the immediacy and
reality requirements 228 required by the Supreme Court's decision in Maryland
Casualty Co. v. Pacific Coal & Oil Co.2 2 9

In evaluating "all the circumstances"

surrounding the case, the court looked to the language which required that an Article
III dispute be of "sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a
declaratory judgment."230 Immediacy is a temporal requirement which mandates
that there be a nexus between purported infringing activity and instigation of a
suit. 23 1 In a DJA action, this requires that there be a reasonable apprehension of

imminent (ie. immediate) threat. 232 "The greater the length of this interim period
223 Id.

Inline's characterization of the dismissal as "personal" and "non-transferable" did
not affect, limit, or condition the promise not to sue as to Atlantech, which was
the only party before the district court charged with infringement. Future
disputes relating to Atlantech's successors in interest and others in privity with
Atlantech are just that-future disputes. They must be left to future cases and are
not ripe for consideration in this case.
Id.
224 363 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
225 Sierra Applied Scis., Inc. v. Advanced Energy Indus., Inc., 258 F.Supp.2d 1148, 1154 (D.
Colo. 2003, affd 363 F.3d 1361 (Fed.Cir. 2004). See Sierra, 363 F.3d at 1372.
226 Sierra,363 F.3d at 1375.
227 Id. at 1374.
228 Id. at 1379 ("The greater the variability of the subject of a declaratory-judgment suit,

particularly as to its potentially infringing features, the greater the chance that the court's
judgment will be purely advisory, detached from the eventual, actual content of that subject-in
short, detached from eventual reality."); see also Telectronics Pacing Sys., Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc., 982
F.2d 1520, 1526-27 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (noting that the reality requirement looks to whether the design
of the purported infringing product is sufficiently fixed; unlike the "concrete steps" inquiry, which
looks to steps taken after finalization of a design, the issue is whether the infringing aspects of the
product would actually make it a finished product).
229 312 U.S. 270 (1941).
230 SierraApplied Scis., 363 F.3d at 1372 (quoting Md. Cas. Co., 312 U.S. at 273).
231 Id. at 1378-79.
232 Id.

[8:1 2008]

Sacking Super Sack

[between a threat of suit and a DJA action], the more likely the case lacks the
requisite immediacy." 233 A four year interim between initial threats by Advanced
Energy and legal action by Sierra would have been insufficient but for intervening
actions by Advanced Energy. 234 The Federal Circuit found that "Sierra could no
longer have reasonably apprehended an infringement suit aimed at its disclosed
manufacturing and sales of [its product] .-235

1. The License Cases
Metabolite Labs., Inc. v. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings, 23 6 an Infringement First
case, considered whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists in the presence of a
license agreement that was in effect and not breached by the licensee. Neither the
district court nor the parties addressed the question of subject-matter jurisdiction
during trial, which resulted in a jury verdict in favor of Metabolite. 237 The Federal
Circuit, however, addressed the subject-matter jurisdiction issue sue sponte, because
the issue of jurisdiction exists at all stages of a case. 2 3 8 The Federal Circuit held that
a current license that has not been breached serves as a de facto covenant not to
sue. 23 9 With a license in place, the licensor cannot sue for infringement and the
licensee cannot challenge the validity of the patent; DJA jurisdiction for both is
240
lacking.
Gen-Probe Inc. v. Vysis, Inc.,241 a DJA First case, involved the question of
whether a license paid "under protest" was sufficient to establish subject-matter
jurisdiction. At trial, the district court rejected Vysis's motion to dismiss the case for
lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. 242 The jury thereafter found that the patent in
question was invalid and not infringed. 243 On appeal, the Federal Circuit revisited
the issue of subject-matter jurisdiction, and relying on the holdings in Super Sack
and Fina Research, the Court found that a license agreement effectively removed any
apprehension of suit. 244 The Federal Circuit reasoned that without a material breach
of the license agreement, Gen-Probe would have no reason to believe that it would be
sued for infringement; apprehension would only lie if either party were in material
breach and an infringement suit was imminent. 245 Payment of royalties "under
246
protest" was deemed insufficient to establish subject-matter jurisdiction.
2:3:3
Id. at

1379.

234 Id. at 1374.
2 5 Id.
2:36370 F.3d 1354
237

(Fed. Cir. 2004).

Id. at 1369.

238 d.

2:39Id.
240 Id.
Contra MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 764, 776 (2007) (reversing the
finding that a non-breached license agreement serves as a do faeto covenant not to sue).
241 359 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
242 Gen-Probe Inc. v. Vysis, Inc., No. 99-CV-2668 H(AJB), 2002 WL 34413199, at *7 (S.D. Cal.

Aug. 5, 2002). See Gon-Probo, 359 F.3d at 1379.
243 Id. at *8.
244 Gen-Probe, 359 F.3d at 1381.
245, Id.
246 Id. at 1381-82.
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MedImmune, Inc. v. Centocor, Inc. 247 is a DJA First case in which the Federal

Circuit looked to whether the presence of a non-breached license agreement vitiated
subject-matter jurisdiction in a DJA action asserting invalidity and unenforceability.
The district court, following the Gen-Probe holding, held that a non-breaching
licensee did not raise an actual controversy sufficient to establish subject-matter
jurisdiction. 248 MedImmune argued that the Gen-Probe holding was contrary to
Supreme Court precedent established in Cardinal Chemical and, thus, Gen-Probe
was incorrectly decided. 249 The Federal Circuit disagreed. 250 CardinalChemical, it
held, did not reach the issue asserted by Medlmmune-namely that Cardinal
Chemical altered the way in which the trial court should evaluate subject-matter
jurisdiction. 251 CardinalChemical merely dealt with the Federal Circuit's use of the
"mootness doctrine" by which it declines to evaluate claims of invalidity if a finding of
252
non-infringement is upheld by the Federal Circuit.

2. The ReasonableApprehension Cases
A DJA First case, Plumtree Software, Inc. v. Datamize, LLC 253 looked to
whether the actions of the DJA defendant were sufficient to place the DJA plaintiff
under a reasonable apprehension of suit. The patent at issue was a continuation
application that emanated from a parent patent that was the subject of another
infringement suit between the two parties. 254 At the instigation of the parent patent
suit, Datamize sent a letter to Plumtree asserting that it believed that Plumtree
infringed its soon-to-be-issued continuation application. 255 In an infringement suit
for a related patent to which Plumtree was not a defendant, Datamize also responded
to an interrogatory stating that it believed Plumtree was infringing on its
256
continuation patent.
Plumtree eventually brought a DJA action in a different court asserting
invalidity of the later issued continuation patents, prompting Datamize to file a
motion for dismissal arguing that subject-matter jurisdiction did not exist because
too much time had elapsed between the patent owners' allegation of infringement
and the DJA lawsuit filing. 257

The district court held that a proper "case or

247406 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
248 Centocor, Inc. v. MedImmune, Inc., No. C-02-03252 CRB, 2002 WL 31465299, at *4 (N.D.
Cal. Oct. 22, 2002). See Med7mmune, 406 F.3d at 1378-79.
219 Medlmmune, 406 F.3d at 1380.
250 Id.
251

Id.

See Cardinal Chem., 508 U.S. at 98. But see Super Sack Mfg. Corp. v. Chase Packaging
Corp., 57 F.3d 1054, 1060 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (declining to extend this same argument stating that the
Cardinal Chem. holding did not apply district court decisions appealed to the Federal Circuit where
there was no finding on either validity or infringement in the district court).
253 473 F.3d 1152 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
254 Plumtree Software, Inc. v. Datamize, LLC, No. C-04-2777 VRW, 2005 WL 2206495, at *1
(N.D. Cal. Sept. 12, 2005); see Plum tree, 473 F.3d at 1156.
255 Plumtree, 2005 WL 2206495, at *3.
252

257

Id. at *4.
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controversy" existed and thus denied the motion. 258 On appeal, Datamize argued
that the passage of two years between the implementation of the prior patent
infringement suit and the present declaratory judgment action was too long to
constitute a continuing reasonable apprehension. 259 The Federal Circuit held that
Datamize's continued actions did put Plumtree under a reasonable apprehension of
suit. 260 It also noted that without a covenant not to sue, there are very narrow
circumstances from which a reasonable apprehension of suit may be dissipated. 261 A
holding otherwise, the Federal Circuit noted, would result in "scare-and-run tactics
262
that the Declaratory Judgment Act was intended to forestall."

1. FactuallyDistinguishingSuper Sack, Pre-MedImmune
From the foregoing, a pattern is evident in the case law after the Super Sack
decision. The cases tend to be classified into those which, for the most part, limit the
Super Sack holding to facts very similar thereto, or follow Super Sack, or those that
distinguish the Super Sack based on the factual background. The distinguishing
arguments were based on: (1) lack of a reasonable apprehension, (2) existence of a
non-breached license, or (3) mootness.
Super Sack and its progeny stood as the law for many years, albeit with
numerous corrections as each new fact situation required adjustment of the
discretionary standard. Many of these cases cited Super Sack only to distinguish the
facts on one point or another, thereby avoiding application of the Super Sack holding.
As is true with many of the Federal Circuit's legal interpretations specifically applied
to patent cases, the tide was turning. In developing the two-part justiciability test in
Super Sack, the Federal Circuit interpreted application of patent law as being
different from other areas of the law, particularly on procedural grounds. 263 The
Supreme Court in recent years has, possibly by design, rendered several opinions
that tilt toward reining in the Federal Circuit's reliance on patent-specific
applications of Supreme Court precedent. 264 Though patent law has some specific
legal aspects that the Federal Circuit must necessarily take into account, patent
cases are no different than any other area of law and must be in conformity with
general precepts of the law in areas where it is appropriate. One of these areas is
258 Id.

at *7.

259 Plumtree, 473

F.3d at 1159-60.

Id. at 1160.
261Id. at 1159.
2 2 Id. (quoting Fina Research, S.A. v. Baroid Ltd., 141 F.3d 1479, 1484 (Fed. Cir.1998)).
263 Super Sack Mfg. Corp. v. Chase Packaging Corp., 57 F.3d 1058 (citing BP Chems., Ltd. v.
Union Carbide Corp., 4 F.3d 975, 978 (Fed. Cir. 1993)).
264 See Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 128 S. Ct. 2109 (2008) (overturning the
Federal Circuit's holding that method patents are not subject to patent exhaustion); KSR Int'l Co. v.
Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007) (holding that the Federal Circuit's narrow interpretation of
obviousness, as enunciated in the "teaching, suggestion, or motivation" test, deviates from Supreme
Court precedent); MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 764 (2007) (holding that the
Federal Circuit's requirement that parties breach a contract in order to retain subject-matter
20

jurisdiction to file suit for a declaratory judgment improperly applied Supreme Court precedent);

eBay Inc. v. MereExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006) (chastising the Federal Circuit for reading
limitations with regard to permanent injunctions into the Patent Act where none existed).
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certainly the interpretation of the DJA and the standards by which subject-matter
jurisdiction is established.
Fort James Corp. V. Solo Cup Co., 265 is a case that shares a similar factual
background to Super Sack and will thus be discussed in greater detail. Procedurally,
Fort James is an Infringement First case in which Fort James sued Solo Cup for
patent infringement. 266 Solo Cup thereafter counterclaimed for invalidity, noninfringement, and unenforceability.2 67 The case was bifurcated by the district court,
and a jury found the patent valid and not infringed upon.2 68 A later bench trial was
set to determine unenforceability due to inequitable conduct. 269 Before the trial,
when Solo Cup was ready to produce evidence of unenforceability and inequitable
conduct, Fort James issued a unilateral covenant not to sue along with a promise not
to appeal the jury's non-infringement verdict.270 The district court, citing Super
Sack, dismissed the remaining counterclaims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction
noting that "in light of the Post-Verdict Covenant there was no actual controversy
between the parties capable of resolution by a hearing on the unenforceability [of the
patent] .... "271
The Federal Circuit reversed, holding that "a counterclaim questioning the
validity or unenforceability of a patent raises issues beyond the initial claim of
infringement that are not disposed of by a decision of non-infringement." 272 The
court distinguished Super Sacks covenant not to sue from FortJames' jury finding
of non-infringement by emphasizing the presence of a jury finding in FortJames over
the admission of the counterclaim defendant that infringement was not an issue as in
Super Sack.273 The Federal Circuit held that even after the finding of noninfringement and a subsequent post-verdict covenant not to sue, the district court
should have retained jurisdiction over the counterclaim issues of invalidity and
27 5
unenforceability.2 74 According to precedent established in Fin Control Systems,
the district court "was obligated to consider and rule on defendant's counterclaims of
invalidity and unenforceability prior to entering [final] judgment."27 6 The court
announced its holding even though a case or controversy no longer existed, if the
2 77
logic of Super Sack is followed, with regard to the patent's effect on Solo Cup.
The Fort James holding enunciates the slippery nature of the Federal Circuit's
interpretation of its own Super Sack ruling regarding divestiture of subject-matter
jurisdiction due to an absence of a case or controversy. A change in the facts,
although not in the result of proceedings, in the lower court has an effect in the
weighing of discretionary factors in making the decision of whether the court
continues to have any jurisdiction in respect to the unenforceability counterclaim.
412 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
Id.at 1342.
20G7Id. at 1343.
268 Id.at 1344.
269 Id.at 1345.
265
266

270 Id.

271Id.at
272

Id.

273

Id.

1348.

Id.
275 Fin Control Sys. Pty, Ltd. v. OAM, Inc., 265 F.3d 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
276 FOrt James, 412 F.3d at 1349.
277 See id. at 1348.
274
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Fort James held that even after a jury finding of non-infringement, and despite a
finding of validity, the district court must retain jurisdiction to evaluate the
counterclaim for unenforceability due to inequitable conduct.278 The only factual
differences present in FortJames that distinguish the facts from Super Sack appear
to be the initial jury finding, followed by the covenant not to sue and promise to not
appeal the non-infringement verdict, and perhaps that unenforceability had been
plead and was at issue in the case before the jury trial. 279 It is an interesting
distinction; a pre-verdict covenant not to sue divests the court of subject-matter
jurisdiction, while a post-verdict covenant not to sue does not. 280 This holding fails to
provide clear rules of jurisdiction to the district court whether to retain jurisdiction
over counterclaims for unenforceability; the Federal Circuit's seemingly inconsistent
precedents appear to leave the trial courts asea.
Separate from whether the infringement claims are disposed of via a covenant
not to sue or a jury verdict of non-infringement, the Super Sack holding, taken at face
value, is clearly dependent on the issue of whether there is a "reasonable
apprehension" of further litigation on the part of the defendant.2 81 Here Fort James
clearly showed its stripes - it promised not to sue, promised not to appeal the noninfringement verdict, and tried to meet all the other requirements of Super Sack that
permitted a plaintiff to walk away - all in an attempt to withdraw from the court any
282
grounds to disturb the presumption of validity or render the patent unenforceable.
While the plot is slightly different, the motivation of the patent owner appears to be
taken from the Super Sack story line. When faced with a certainly unfavorable
result, and the issue of unenforceability due to inequitable conduct reared up as a
possible basis for a court finding of exceptional case, counsel for the patent owner
reached for its escape hatch, as allowed by the Super Sack holding, and the district
court did what it was obliged to do and dismissed the counterclaim. 2 83 The Federal
Circuit failed to uphold this attempted extension of Super Sack. However, and
perhaps in a late realization of the appearance of injustice present in allowing a
patent owner to escape a finding of unenforceability, the Federal Circuit produced a
different result, thereby confusing the sea charts even further.
The distinguishing feature in the Fort James opinion-that the covenant not to
sue was issued after the verdict of non-infringement was reached-may have been
expected to invoke the Court's own mootness doctrine (assuming the noninfringement jury finding was upheld). As it is commonly interpreted, the mootness
doctrine allows the Federal Circuit to render moot any outstanding claims of

278

Id. at 1349.

Compare id. at 1351 (reversing the district court's dismissal of the unenforceability
counterclaim reached after the post-verdict covenant), with Super Sack Mfg. Corp. v. Chase
Packaging Corp., 57 F.3d 1054, 1060 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (upholding the dismissal of the case after the
covenant not to sue was reached and before the trial had begun).
280 Compare Super Sack, 57 F.3d at 1056 (noting that the covenant not to sue divested the
court of subject matter jurisdiction), with Fort James, 412 F.3d at 1348-49 (noting that a
counterclaim for unenforceability raises issues beyond the initial infringement claim that must still
be decided).
281 Soe Super Sack, 57 F.3d at 1059.
282 Fort James, 412 F.3d at 1345.
283 See id. at 1349.
279
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invalidity or unenforceability, at its discretion, upon a finding of non-infringement. 284
Thus, because the jury's finding of non-infringement was not brought up on appeal,
the remaining claims of invalidity and unenforceability could have been properly
disposed of as providing an advisory ruling for parties that had no further stake in
the outcome of a the case. The question was one of "case or controversy" and whether
there remained any reasonable apprehension for a lawsuit. After the jury verdict of
non-infringement, there remained no controversy with regard to Fort James's claims
against Solo Cup because a reasonable apprehension of further litigation was
lacking. 28 5 Solo Cup was no longer under any apprehension of suit and, in fact, after

286
the covenant not to sue, was not even in apprehension of an appeal.
Highway Equipment Co. v. FECO, Ltd.2 87 is an Infringement First case in which
the issue of whether a covenant not to sue divested the district court of subjectmatter jurisdiction to find the case exceptional under 35 U.S.C. § 285288 and to award
attorney's fees. The district court dismissed the infringement claim with prejudice,
but held that it retained jurisdiction to rule on the § 285 issue. 28 9 On appeal,
Highway Equipment argued that the dismissal of the infringement action did not
change the legal relationship of the parties and, as such, the court did not have
jurisdiction to rule on the § 285 issue.2 90 The Federal Circuit held that based on the
wording of § 285, the statute constituted its own basis of jurisdiction.2 91 It also held
that the district court's dismissal with prejudice constituted a legal change in the
relationship of the parties sufficient for the court to entertain § 285 exceptionality
motions. 292 If a DJA plaintiff is seeking for the court to retain jurisdiction, a motion

281 See Phonometrics, Inc. v. N. Telecom Inc., 133 F.3d 1459, 1468 (Fed. Cir. 1998) ("We have
previously held that a district court has discretion to dismiss a counterclaim alleging that a patent is
invalid as moot where it finds no infringement.").
285 Fort James, 412 F.3d at 1348.
286 See id.; see also Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Forest Labs., Inc., 527 F.3d 1278 (Fed. Cir.
2008), petition for eert filed (Nov. 6, 2008) (No.08-624); MedImmune, Inc. v. Centocor, Inc., 409
F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
287 469 F.3d 1027 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
288 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2006) ("The court in exceptional cases may award reasonable attorney fees
to the prevailing party.").
289 Highway Equip. Co. v. FECO, Ltd., No. C03-0076, 2005 WL 936469, at *5 (N.D. Iowa Apr.
22, 2005). Soe HighwayEqu p. Co., 469 F.3d at 1031.
290 HighwayEquip. Co., 469 F.3d at 1032.
291 Id. at 1032-33.
292 I-d. at 1035. The tighway Equipment Co. court distinguished Super Sack in that the court
found that the exceptional case provision of § 285 constitutes its own independent basis of
jurisdiction and thus a covenant not to sue does not remove jurisdiction over that matter. Id. In
other words, the court retained jurisdiction not over issues relating to the patent, but jurisdiction
over the parties to render a fair and complete judgment. Id. at 1027. While following the court's
logic in Super Sack, unenforceability and invalidity do not provide independent bases of jurisdiction
for purposes of retaining the counterclaim, the issue is one of fairness and public policy. Id. If a
purported infringer brought a DJA action attacking a patent solely on invalidity or unenforceability,
without including a claim for non-infringement, would the district court have jurisdiction to hear the
case? Under SuporSaek, it is doubtful, but following ModImmune, discussed below, the issue is less
clearly decided. Id.; see also MedImmune, Inc. v. Centocor, Inc., 549 U.S. 118.(2007) (holding that
the Federal Circuit erred in affirming the dismissal of a declaratory judgment action based on lack
of subject matter jurisdiction when a view of all the circumstances showed that a justiciable
controversy existed).
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for finding an exceptional case may be one avenue of achieving some measure of
justice. However, the standard of proof for such a finding is high.

E. Other FederalCircuit "Case or Controversy" Cases,Pre-MedImmune
In a DJA First case, Samsung Electronics Co. v. Rambus, Inc.,293 the Federal
Circuit looked to the question of whether a party can vitiate subject-matter
jurisdiction over 35 U.S.C. § 285294 exceptionality claims, and by implication,
counterclaims of unenforceability, by offering to pay the opposing party's attorney's
fees. In Samsung, Rambus initially filed suit for infringement to which Samsung
counterclaimed for invalidity, unenforceability and non-infringement. 295 In order to
avoid collateral estoppel issues not relevant to this discussion, Rambus filed a
covenant not to sue on its claims of infringement. 296 Samsung thereafter moved to
have the case declared exceptional under § 285, which would allow the district court
to retain subject-matter jurisdiction over its unenforceability counterclaims pursuant
to the holding in Highway Equipment.297 Rambus, however, made a written offer to
298
pay Samsung's entire requested amount and issued a formal offer of judgment
under FRCP 68(a).299 Samsung refused this offer and the district court thereafter
entered an order denying attorney's fees but also issued a finding adverse to Rambus
with respect to spoliation of evidence due to unclean hands.300 The Federal Circuit
found fault with the district court's determinations on two grounds.301 First, the
court noted that exceptionality under § 285 does not involve two independent
determinations because exceptionality and the imposition of attorney's fees are
intertwined and the court cannot make a determination of exceptionality as its own
separate sanction.3 02 Second, in a curious twist on the mootness doctrine, the
Federal Circuit was divested of subject-matter jurisdiction to issue a determination of
exceptionality as soon as the DJA defendant made its offer of attorney's fees.303 An
offer of attorney's fees, in their entire amount, gives the DJA plaintiff exactly what it
is seeking, and thus, there no longer remains an Article III "case or controversy" on

29:
294

523 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
35 U.S.C. § 285 (2006).

295 Samsung Elecs. Co. v. Rambus, Inc., 440 F.Supp.2d 512, 514 (E.D.Va. 2006); see Samsung,
523 F.3d at 1376.
296

Samung 440 F.Supp.2d at 516.

297

Id.at 518-19.

298Id. at 518.
299 FED. R. Civ. P. 68(a).
More than 10 days before the trial begins, a party defending against a claim
may serve on an opposing party an offer to allow judgment on specified terms,
with the costs then accrued. If, within 10 days after being served, the opposing
party serves written notice accepting the offer, either party may then file the offer
and notice of acceptance, plus proof of service. The clerk must then enter
judgment.

Id.
Samsung Elecs. Co. v. Rambus, Inc., 523 F.3d 1374, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
at 1377-78.
302 Id. at 1379.
303 Id. at 1380.
300

301 Id.
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which a court may rely for retaining jurisdiction.3 0 4
Fin ControlSys. Pty.Ltd. v. OAM/I, Inc., 3° 5 an Infringement First case, raised the
issue of whether a district court must entertain arguments addressing counterclaims
of invalidity and unenforceability once a determination of non-infringement has been
made. The district court granted summary judgment of non-infringement after a
claim construction hearing and, in its holding, stated that because the patent was
found not to be infringed, "defendant shall have judgment against plaintiff with
respect to plaintiffs complaint and with respect to defendant's counterclaim." 30 6 On
appeal, Fin Control argued that in its ruling the district court sue sponte held that
the patent in question was invalid and unenforceable without allowing Fin Control to
present evidence and argument in opposition. 30 7 The Federal Circuit agreed that the
district court's finding for the plaintiff was improper without giving Fin Control an
opportunity to properly present its contrary position on the issues of patent validity
and unenforceability. 308 The Federal Circuit noted that because invalidity and
unenforceability were raised in the counterclaim, "the court was obliged to rule on
30
these matters as a prerequisite to entering judgment in the case."

9

By finding that the district court is obliged to rule on the invalidity and
unenforceability portions of the counterclaim, the Federal Circuit appears to be
adhering to the road mapped out by the Supreme Court in Cardinal Chemical
apparently holding that the district court is in the same position relative to the
Federal Circuit when the case is appealed thereto as is the Federal Circuit in a
Supreme Court appeal. 310 To avoid piecemeal appeals, all issues before the district
court need to be resolved before judgment can be entered. 311 Here the district court
found non-infringement and summarily held for the defendant on all its
counterclaims. 312 This included finding the patent invalid and unenforceable, against
which the plaintiff patent owner was not granted an opportunity to present any
'304
Id. Samsungwas also interesting for statements made by the district court judge regarding
the decision to retain jurisdiction and the relation of exceptionality to bad faith litigation. After
noting that the first goal of § 285 sanctions was to compensate the prevailing party for its monetary
outlay, the court noted, "[s]econd, and of equal, if not greater, importance, the sanction serves to
deter parties from bringing or prosecuting bad faith litigation. The sanction thus protects litigants,
the courts, and the judicial process from abuse." Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd. v. Rambus, Inc., 439 F.
Supp. 2d 524, 531 (E.D. Va. 2006) (citations omitted). As is evident from the opinion, the district
court found it insufficient that the defendant received all it was asking for. One major difference
with the subsequent Federal Circuit opinion and reasoning is that the extent of a plaintiffs perfidy
is not brought out into the light where it can be seen for what it is. The logic behind this reasoning
is similar to that behind the logic in the original Super Sack decision, where it was considered
sufficient for the defendant to avoid paying damages on a dubious infringement claim. Comparo id.
(addressing the bad faith issue within the case), with Super Sack Mfg. Corp. v. Chase Packaging
Corp., 57 F.3d 1054, 1060 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (failing to look into the bad faith issue). Following a long
fought litigation, a defendant may find greater satisfaction in receiving confirmation of bad faith on
the part of the patent owner than in receiving only a monetary award.
305 265 F.3d 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
306 Id. at 1317.
'307 Id.
308 Id.at 1321.
309 Id. (explaining that the issue here is not that the court must issue a finding for or against
the counterclaims, but that it must not adopt a such a position without proper consideration).
310 Soo id
311 FED. R. Civ. P. 54(b).
312

Id.
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argument.3 13 Allowing this would logically estop the plaintiff from asserting its
patent rights against anyone else because the district court entered a ruling of
invalidity and unenforceability that was final as to that patent (unless the case was
appealed, as it was).314 It is probable that had the district court entered judgment of
non-infringement and dismissed the invalidity and unenforceability counterclaims as
moot, Fin Control presumably would not have appealed, as the presumption of patent
315
validity would have been untouched.
General Electric Co. v. Nintendo Co., Ltd.,316 an Infringement First case,
discussed the issue of whether a determination of invalidity due to anticipation, as
determined by the district court, must be reviewed by the Federal Circuit. The court
found that the Federal Circuit's "mootness doctrine" was inapplicable under this fact
situation because the appellant was appealing the finding of invalidity, not the
absence of a finding of invalidity. 317 As the court said, "our affirmance of a district
court's judgment of non-infringement does not, by itself, moot the declaratory
judgment claim of invalidity."3 18 Failure to address the determination of invalidity
would "deprive the 'patentee [itself] of the appellate review that is a component of the
3 19
one full and fair opportunity to have the validity issue adjudicated correctly.'-

F. MedImmune and the New JusticiabilityTest
320
The Supreme Court's opinion in Medlmmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc.
redefined in two major ways patent law precedent when a declaratory judgment
action was sought. First, the Court held that a licensee need not breach its contract
before bringing a declaratory judgment action for non-infringement.3 21 Second, the
Court rejected the "reasonable apprehension" portion of the Federal Circuit's twopart justiciability test 3 22 that was first formulated in the 1984 case of Jervis B. Webb
Co. v. Southern Systems, Inc. 323 and had been controlling precedent.

313 Id. at 1321-22.
314 IN. at 1322.

'315 See id. at 1321.
316 179 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
317 Id. at 1353.
3'18 Id. at 1356; see also Paragon Podiatry Lab., Inc. v. KLM Labs., Inc., 984 F.2d 1182, 1188 n.6
(Fed. Cir. 1993) (noting that the same issue is not mooted by the Federal Circuit's decision holding a
patent invalid in view of defendant's motion for attorney fees); Buildex Inc. v. Kason Indus., Inc.,
849 F.2d 1461, 1466 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (noting that the same issue is not moot and remanding for a
redetermination of inequitable conduct and for consideration of defendant's request for attorney
fees).
319 Gen. Elec. Co., 179 F.3d at 1356 (quoting Cardinal Chem. Co. v. Morton Int'l, Inc., 508 U.S.
83, 102 (1993)).
320 127 S. Ct. 764 (2007).
'321Id. at 777.
322 Id. at 772-74.
323 742 F.2d 1388, 1399 (Fed. Cir. 1984).

Jrvis B. Webb is believed to be the first case in
which the Federal Circuit two-part justiciability test was enunciated.
Id. The "reasonable
apprehension" requirement of the test was derived from C.R. Bard, Inc. v. Schwartz, 716 F.2d 874,
879 (Fed. Cir. 1983), while the "concrete steps" requirement was derived from Sweethea-t Plastics,
Inc. v. Illinois Too] Works, Inc., 439 F.2d 871, 875 (1st Cir. 1971). Id.

[8:1 2008]

The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law

Medlmmune was a DJA First case in which the Court addressed whether a
licensee is required to breach its license agreement, exposing itself to treble damages
for willful infringement, in order to properly bring a DJA action for noninfringement, invalidity, and/or unenforceability. 324 The license in question stated
that the "licensed products" are any which "infringe one or more of the claims of
either or both of the covered patents, which have neither expired nor been held
invalid by a court or other body of competent jurisdictionfrom which no appeal has
been taken."325

The district court held, and the Federal Circuit affirmed, that

subject-matter jurisdiction over the DJA action did not exist pursuant to the Federal
326
Circuit's two-part justiciability test.

After disposing of various arguments related to the terminology of the license
agreement, the Supreme Court began its analysis by noting the standard set forth in
Maryland Casualty Co. v. Pacific Coal & Oil Co.327 This case states that a DJA
dispute must be:
'definite and concrete, touching the legal relations of the parties having
adverse legal interests'; and that it be 'real and substantial' and 'admi[t] of
specific relief through a decree of a conclusive character, as distinguished
from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state
of facts.'

328

The question thereafter posited was whether acts by the plaintiff that eliminate the
imminent threat of harm by generally not doing what it claimed it had a right to do
created sufficient grounds for jurisdiction based on the DJA.329 A licensee, said the
Court, need not expose itself to a breach of contract action in order to attain subject330
matter jurisdiction sufficient to satisfy the DJA.
After this discussion, the Court further explained that this determination, in
effect, overrules the Federal Circuit's "reasonable apprehension" portion of the twopart justiciability test.331 In addition to the above, the Court noted two other
instances in which the reasonable apprehension test was in conflict with Supreme
Court precedent. First, the Court discussed Maryland Casualty and Aetna Life,
which both held that an insurer may bring a DJA action against a victimizer without
332
having to wait for the insured-victim to first bring suit against the victimizer.
Here, the insurer is under no apprehension of suit because the insured-victim is the
entity that is harmed. 333 The cases thus allow for a declaration of rights where no

3'21MedImmune,

127 S. Ct. at 767.
325 Id. at 768 (emphasis added).
326 Medimmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., No. 03-2567, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28680, *17 (C.D.

Cal. Apr. 23, 2004), affd, 427 F.3d 958 (Fed. Cir. 2005), rev'd 127 S. Ct. 764 (2007); MedImmune,
Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 427 F.3d 958, 961 (Fed. Cir. 2005), rev'd, 127 S. Ct. 764 (2007).
327 312 U.S. 270 (1941).

'328 MedImmune, 127 S. Ct. at 771 (alteration in original) (quoting Aetna Life Ins. Co. v.
Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240-41 (1937)).
329 Id. at 772.
330 Id.
331 Id. at 774 n.ll.
332 -d.at 771-74.

33 Id. at 772.
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subject-matter jurisdiction would normally lie.3 3 4 Second, the Court held that the
"reasonable apprehension" test goes against the teaching of Cardinal Chemical,
"which held that appellate affirmance of a judgment of non-infringement, eliminating
any apprehension of suit, does not moot a declaratory judgment counterclaim of
patent invalidity."335
The Supreme Court's rejection of the "reasonable
apprehension" test has been interpreted to lower the threshold by which subjectmatter jurisdiction may vest in a DJA plaintiff. 336 The new test is colloquially
referred to as the "all the circumstances" test and enunciates that a court must look
to all the circumstances surrounding the issue before it, not merely on whether the
337
declaratory judgment plaintiff is under reasonable apprehension of suit.

G. Post-Medlmmune Cases ofNote
While MedImmune effectively redefined the justiciability test to determine
subject matter jurisdiction in DJA actions, the Federal Circuit has not embraced the
precedent whole-heartedly. Whether findings of non-infringement - either through a
covenant not to sue or by a failure to file a non-infringement counterclaim - divest
the court of subject-matter jurisdiction over invalidity and unenforceability claims
appears to be an undecided issue. The relevant cases following MedImmune expose
the Federal Circuit's divergent theories on this point and lay the foundation for the
Federal Circuit to put the issue to rest once and for all.
Caraeo Pharmaceutical.Laboratories,Ltd. v. Forest Laboratories,Inc.,338 is a
DJA First case in which the issue of subject-matter jurisdiction arose based on the
intricacies of the Hatch-Waxman Act, 33 9 which regulates the means by which a
generic pharmaceutical may be brought to market. Specifically, the Hatch-Waxman
Act calls for a party seeking to produce a generic version of an approved, patented
drug to file an abbreviated new drug application ("ANDA").340 Once approved by the
Food & Drug Administration ("FDA"), the first filer of an ANDA holds exclusive
rights to market a new generic drug for 180 days after expiration of the original
drug's exclusivity grant.3 41 The 180-day period is triggered by either a commercial

334
335

Id. at 774 n.il.
Id. (citing Cardinal Chem. Co. v. Morton Int'l, Inc., 508 U.S. 83, 96 (1993)).

:36 Id. (replacing the "reasonable-apprehension" test with the "all the circumstances" test).

See

also Jennifer R. Saionz, Note, DeclaratoryJudgment Actions in Patent Cases: The FederalCircuits
Response to MedImmune v. Genentech, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 161, 191-92 (2008) (stating that a
patent holder essentially gains jurisdiction under the DJA by simply obtaining the patent).
337 MedImmune, 127 S. Ct. at 771.
338 527 F.3d 1278, 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
'339 Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, secs.
101-05, 98 Stat. 1585, 1585-97 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 355, 360 (2006)).
340 21 U.S.C. § 355(a)-(b); see also Ca±raeoPharm. Labs., 527 F.3d at 1282 (stating that filing
an ANDA allows a generic drug manufacturer to bypass the usual FDA testing requirements if it
can show that the generic in question is the bioequivalent of the approved drug).
341 See id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv); see also Caraeo Pharm. Labs., 527 F.3d at 1283 ("The HatchWaxman Act provides that the 180-day period of exclusivity begins either on the date that the first
Paragraph IV ANDA filer begins marketing its generic drug, or on the date of the final court
decision finding the relevant Orange-Book-listed patents invalid or not infringed, whichever comes
first.")
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sale or by a judgment of non-infringement on the part of the ANDA holder. 342 NonANDA holders may not produce generics, even if they are not infringing because the
FDA certification process, in accordance with the Hatch-Waxman Act, will not allow
the secondary generic manufacturer to produce the generic without the previous
certification and the 180-day window running. 343 The district court dismissed the
DJA action for lack of an Article III case or controversy relying on the Federal
Circuit's reasonable apprehension test.344 The Federal Circuit reversed applying
MedImmunds newly-enunciated "all the circumstances" test.3 45 Noting that Caraco
itself was barred by FDA rules from manufacturing the generic drug without the
ANDA holder triggering the 180-day exclusivity, the court found that a case or
controversy did exist.3 46 It was immaterial that Forest issued a covenant not to sue
because there remained a substantial controversy between the parties sufficient to
3 47
satisfy Article III and allow the court to retain jurisdiction.
Adenta GmbH v. OrthoArm, Inc.3 48 took up the issue of whether, inter alia, the
lack of a counterclaim for infringement in a DJA First case resulted in a loss of
subject-matter jurisdiction over the patent at issue. This issue was brought up by
the Federal Circuit, sue sponte, in its determination of whether the district court
correctly retained subject-matter jurisdiction. 349 The court relied on its decision in
Capo, Inc. v. Dioptics Medical Products, Inc.3 50 to dispel this issue, holding that a
failure of a DJA defendant to counterclaim for infringement does not remove subjectmatter jurisdiction because there remains an adequate case or controversy pursuant
to the Supreme Court's MedImmune decision.3 51 This holding 352 overruled the
353
Federal Circuit's decision in Mobile Oil.
312 CaraeoPharm. Labs., 527 F.3d at 1284 C[T]he applicable statutory provisions provide for
two methods of triggering the first Paragraph IV ANDA filer's 180-day exclusivity period: (1) a
commercial-marketing trigger pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv)(I) (2000) and (2) a courtjudgment trigger pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv)(II) (2000).").
343 Id.
at 1283 ("Until the first Paragraph IV ANDA filer's exclusivity period expires, the FDA
may not approve a later-filed Paragraph IV ANDA based on the same ANDA.").
'311Id. at 1289-91.
345 Id.
at 1291 ("In applying the all-the-circumstances test to Caraco's declaratory judgment
action, we are guided by the Supreme Court's three-part framework for determining whether an
action presents a justiciable Article III controversy.... For the following reasons, we hold that
Caraco's declaratory judgment action satisfies these requirements and presents a justiciable Article
III controversy.").
'316

Id. at 1297.

Id. This immateriality of a covenant not to sue is limited to the facts of the case, namely the
limitations brought about by the regulations of the Food and Drug Administration and the statutory
provisions of the Hatch-Waxman Act. Id. It should not be read broadly to stand for the proposition
that a covenant not to sue is always immaterial. Id.
348 501 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
'319Id. at 1370.
350 387 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
351
Adenta, 501 F.3d at 1370; see Capo, Inc., 387 F.3d at 1356 (holding that "in an action for
declaration of non-infringement, a counterclaim for patent infringement is compulsory and if not
made is deemed waived. [The defendant] cannot avoid a declaratory action by refusing to file the
counterclaim"). Interestingly, this too would seem to overrule the holding of Mobile Oil in which
failure to counterclaim for infringement was seen as removing subject-matter jurisdiction. See
Mobile Oil Corp. v. Advanced Envtl. Recycling Techs, Inc., 92 F.3d 1203 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
352 Id. The Adenta decision removes one of the ways in which the Federal Circuit previously
determined that subject-matter jurisdiction could be withdrawn from the court by an act of a
347
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Benitec Australia, Ltd. v. Nucleonics, Inc.,3 54 an Infringement First case, looked
to whether the statutory lack of an infringement claim along with a covenant not to
sue was sufficient to divest the court of subject-matter jurisdiction. After the
Supreme Court's Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd 3 55 opinion interpreting
35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) 356, Benitec decided it lacked the statutory basis by which it
could claim infringement.3 5 7 Benitec thereafter issued a covenant and promise not to
sue for infringement. 358 The district court dismissed both the infringement claim and
the counter claims for invalidity and unenforceability pursuant to Benitec's FRCP
41(a)(2) motion.35 9 It held that the counterclaims no longer permitted the Court to
retain jurisdiction under the DJA.360 The Federal Circuit agreed, holding that
neither the immediacy nor reality requirement for justiciability was met because of
the uncertainty surrounding Benitec's FDA application and the temporally distant
361
nature of any possible infringement.
Of note, the Benitec court made specific mention of Super Sack and its relation
to the Medlmm une decision:
Although neither Super Sack nor Amana has been expressly overruled,
both applied the disapproved "reasonable apprehension of imminent suit"
test. Therefore, although the holdings in both cases are not necessarily
dependent on the "reasonableapprehensionof imminent suit"requirement,
we nevertheless base our analysis of whether jurisdiction currently exists

defendant in a DJA action - by declining to counterclaim for infringement. Id It is but a short step
to extend this concept to DJA defendants who attempt to avoid subject-matter jurisdiction by issuing
a covenant not to sue. Id. Here and in Mobil Oil, the DJA defendant is admitting that there is no
infringement or that it is declining to pursue infringement. Id. If jurisdiction is retained for a DJA
defendant failing to counterclaim for patent infringement, it is reasonable to assert that it should
also be retained for a DJA defendant issuing a covenant not to sue. Id.
353

Mobile Oil Corp. v. Advanced Envtl. Recycling Techs., Inc., 92 F.3d 1203 (Fed. Cir. 1996).

Mobile Oil held that lack of an infringement counterclaim removed any "reasonable apprehension"
of suit because, if not brought as a mandatory counterclaim, the DJA defendant was thereafter
forever estopped from alleging infringement. Id.

495 F.ad 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2007), cort. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1331 (2008).
545 U.S. 193 (2005) (holding that the patent laws provide a wide berth for the use of
patented drugs in activities related to the federal regulatory process, including preclinical studies
354

'355

and testing a drug's efficacy).
'356

35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2006).
It shall not be an act of infringement to make, use, offer to sell, or sell within
the United States or import into the United States a patented invention (other
than a new animal drug or veterinary biological product (as those terms are used
in the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act and the Act of March 4, 1913) which
is

primarily

hybridoma

manufactured

technology,

using

recombinant

or other processes

DNA,

recombinant

involving site

specific

RNA,

genetic

manipulation techniques) solely for uses reasonably related to the development

and submission of information under a Federal law which regulates the
manufacture, use, or sale of drugs or veterinary biological products.

Id.
357 Benitec,
3 Id.
359Id.
361

Id.

495 F.3d at 1343.
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over Nucleonics's declaratory judgment counterclaims
362
framework of Medlmm une.

strictly on the

Thus, the Federal Circuit dicta apparently states that Super Sack may have been
decided the same way despite the Supreme Court's redefinition of the justiciability
363
standard for DJA actions.
Walter Kidde Portable Equipment, Inc. v. Universal Security Instruments,
Ine.3 6 4 is an Infringement First case in which the question of whether a plaintiffs
dismissal under FRCP 41(a)(2) may be granted without the defendant's approval and
while several of defendant's motions remain before the court. Walter Kidde, in an
attempt to cure a standing deficiency, moved for a dismissal of its original action
365
pursuant to FRCP 41(a)(2) and re-filed its infringement claim the very same day.
The district court granted the dismissal without prejudice over the objections of USI
and while several of USI's motions remained before the court.366 The motions
included counterclaims of invalidity, non-infringement, and unenforceability as well
367
USI
as Sherman Act claims, unfair competition, and state and common law.
appealed, basing its argument on the grounds that FRCP 41(a)(2) provides that as
long as the defendant has a counterclaim pending which is capable of independent
36 8
adjudication, its counterclaims may not be dismissed.
The Federal Circuit began its analysis by noting that it would apply the law of
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit with regard to the
pendency of claims and interpretation of non-patent procedural rules. 369 It also noted
it is within the district court's discretion to grant a plaintiffs motion for voluntary
dismissal without prejudice as long as there was no impairment of the defendant's
legal right. 370 Applying these rules, the Federal Circuit held that the district court
abused its discretion in dismissing the invalidity, non-infringement, and
unenforceability counterclaims, though the error was harmless. 371 The court was
able to hold that the error was harmless because USI's legal rights were not
impaired; they were able to assert the same claims in the case that was filed the
372
same day the original case was dismissed.
When the Federal Circuit examined the counterclaims based on antitrust and
unfair competition, they found both were dismissed in error, and the errors were not
harmless. 373 The dismissal of the antitrust and unfair competition claims were found
3'62Id.

at 1346 (emphasis added).
See id. The author also takes some issue with the statement because Super Sack clearly
was decided on the issue of whether there was a reasonable apprehension of future infringement.
See Super Sack Mfg. Corp. v. Chase Packaging Corp., 57 F.3d 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
364 479 F.3d 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2007), reh'g denied, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 11684 (Fed. Cir. May 3,
2007).
'365 Id. at 1334.
366 Id. at 1332.
367 Id. at 1333.
'368 Id. at 1336.
369 Id. at 1335-36 (noting the abuse of discretion standard utilized in Davis v. USX Corp., 819
F.2d 1270 (4th Cir. 1987)).
370 Id. at 1336.
371 Id. at 1339-41.
372 Id. at 1340.
373 Id. at 1339-40.
363

[8:1 2008]

Sacking Super Sack

to be in error because the counterclaims were filed prior to the motion to dismiss, the
district court retained subject-matter jurisdiction over the claims, and USI made a
timely objection. 374 The court did not discuss the ramifications these standards had
on its decision to find the counterclaims of invalidity, non-infringement, and
unenforceability not in error.3 75 It is clear that the court would have to retain
subject-matter jurisdiction over the claims, but since the plaintiff never offered a
3 76
covenant not to sue, subject-matter jurisdiction seemingly attached.

IV.

CONCLUSION

A. PubhlicPoicy Considerations
Soon after the Super Sack decision was entered, the reasons for making
declaratory judgments available to parties and the historical foundation of the
3 77
Super Sacks
enactment of the DJA were discussed at length in a student note.
decision, it was noted, was rooted in public policy and was an attempt to remove the
specter of an infringement suit from an accused infringer - the so-called "Damoclean
threat with a sheathed sword" which was ever-present prior to the decision.378 The
note concluded that, while the rule in Super Sack was valid for the majority of patent
infringement cases where the litigation was brought in good faith, future litigation
would be impacted in those rare cases where a patent owner abuses the rights
granted under its patent and uses the patent to intimidate competitors with the
threat of litigation.37 9 The above review of the cases citing Super Sack provides
ample evidence that the district courts and, on occasion, the Federal Circuit relied on
all kinds of distinguishing factual issues to avoid applying the stark holding of Super
Sack.
The rare scenario involving the abuse of the rights granted by a patent might
occur where a patent owner, lacking good faith, is guilty of lodging serial patent
infringement lawsuits against putative infringers, only withdrawing those actions by
submitting to the court a covenant not to sue on present products and obtaining
' 71Id. at 1340.
375
376

Id. at 1342.
Compare id. at 1343 (holding that any error the district court made regarding subject-

matter jurisdiction would invariably bring the case full circle and lead to consolidation with the
subsequent action), with Super Sack Mfg. Corp. v. Chase Packaging Corp., 57 F.3d 1054 (Fed. Cir.
1995) (ruling that the when the district court dismissed the case with prejudice, including validity
counterclaims, the patentee could no longer bring a suit for a declaratory judgment of invalidity or
unenforceability unless it once again threatened to produce allegedly infringing products not within

the covenant not to sue). The defendant in Super Sack maintained all the requisites for a finding
error in the dismissal of the case except for subject-matter jurisdiction. Super Sack, 57 F.3d at 1057.

The Walter Kidde holding, when combined with the reconstituted DJA standard of MedImmune,
casts serious doubt as to whether Super Sack remains valid law.
'377Michael G. Munsell, Note,
The Declaratory Judgment Act's Actual Controversy
Requirement: Should A Patent Owners Promise Not to Sue Deprive the Court of Jurisdiction&."

Super Sack Manufacturing Corp. v. Chase Packaging Corp., 62 MO. L. REV. 573 (1997) (analyzing
Super Sack's effect on patent owners in future litigation).
378 Id. at 588 (quoting Arrowhead Indus. Water, Inc. v. Ecolochem, Inc., 846 F.2d 731, 734-35
(Fed. Cir. 1988)).
37) Id. at 589.
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dismissal under FRCP 12(b) for lack of an Article I1 case or controversy. 380 Courts
are charged with dispensing justice, and to utilize their discretion in doing so. It is
reasonable to evaluate the cases of possible abuse of patent rights so as to temper the
right of patent owners to dismiss their case with prejudice while avoiding abuse or
overreaching by patent owners of their rights under the patent laws. The argument
is made herein that the courts have sufficient tools to dispense justice to a patent
owner who is conducting itself in a way that raises the issue of abuse of patent rights
and extension of patent rights beyond those that are reasonably available under law.

B. The Way Forward
In the view of the author, Super Sack was incorrectly decided on its facts and
was, more importantly, contrary to the public policy for which the DJA was instituted
through the long legal and legislative battles almost 100 years ago. The Super Sack
holding puts the imputed infringer in a position where it must defend against an
improvidently brought patent infringement action. It stands to reason that public
policy should not allow a patent owner to walk away from its own case after the
accused infringer uncovers evidence of invalidity, unenforceability, or both. When a
party is accused of infringing a patent it believes to be invalid or unenforceable, its
options are limited. It may either accede to the patent owner's demands and lose
business or it can engage in protracted litigation, only to have the patent owner pull
the rug from under them at the last moment.
It is unclear whether the Supreme Court's decision in Medlmm une will undo the
perceived lack of justice. Even though the MedImmune Court redefined the legal
standard by which subject-matter jurisdiction is determined - the "all the
circumstances test" - the Federal Circuit noted that Super Sack may have turned out
38
the same way.

1

The solution to the ephemeral jurisdictional issues raised by a declaratory
judgment defendant is for the district court to examine closely the issues in a case
and properly apply the "all the circumstances" standard enunciated by the Supreme
Court in MedImmune. 382 That process may require the court to retain jurisdiction of
a case because of pending issues, including counterclaims, even though the direct
issues of infringement, validity, or unenforceability may no longer be before the
court. Some circumstances justifying a court to retain jurisdiction are claims that
the patent owner knowingly asserted an invalid or unenforceable patent, raising the
38 3
scepter of an exceptional case, as was found in Highway Equipment.
Alternatively, if the facts of the case allow, an accused infringer might allege a
violation of Section two of the Sherman Antitrust Act, which unquestionably raises
38 4
an independent basis for court's jurisdiction in a counterclaim adjudication.
See, e.g., Samsung Elecs. Co. v. Rambus, Inc., 398 F. Supp. 2d 470 (E.D. Va. 2005).
Australia, Ltd. v. Nucleonics, Inc., 495 F.3d 1340, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2007), cert.
denied, 128 S. Ct. 2055 (2008).
382MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007).
383 See Highway Equip. Co. v. FECO, Ltd., 469 F.3d 1027 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
384 See generallyWalker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 17677 (1965) (creating the "Walker Processclaim," which is a defense to an infringement suit where the
380

'381 Benitec

defendant raises an antitrust issue related to fraud during the patent's procurement in order to
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Further, a DJA plaintiff might be able to argue that the court should retain
jurisdiction because the DJA plaintiff may have difficulty creating new products, if
action has been taken to introduce such products, without knowing whether a
competitor's patent is invalid or unenforceable. Other factual circumstances that can
be asserted are, for example, that the covenant not to sue fails to completely absolve
the accused infringer of liability. A successful argument of this type would allow the
court to follow the holdings in Arrowhead, Walter Kidde, and Fin Control to name
38 5
but a few, which distinguish the Super Sack holding.
The Super Sack ruling, if it is allowed to stand, gives the putative patent owner
an unfair advantage that should have been obviated by the enactment of the DJA
and the promulgation of FRCP 41(a)(2).386 That is, whereas the DJA was enacted to
avoid the "Damoclean sword" of threatened infringement lawsuits, Super Sack
provides the opportunity for a patent owner to not only file a lawsuit, but also to
stifle competition while the lawsuit is pending. And this while allowing the putative
patent owner to emerge from litigation virtually unscathed once the lawsuit becomes
either legally untenable or begins to enter the realm of an exceptional case under 35
U.S.C. § 285.387
The problem of a patent owner withdrawing from an infringement case it no
longer wishes to pursue due to the accused infringer's evidence of invalidity or
unenforceability is not a theoretical issue; it is a reality. The dismissal of cases based
on jurisdictional grounds have been cited above. A defendant could, in good
conscience, fight the infringement action for years, at great expense, and the plaintiff
could file lawsuits against an entire industry, suing all of its competitors.
Thereafter, when the going gets tough, the plaintiff is easily let off of the hook by a
mere statement in a motion which "covenants not to sue" based on the present
product(s) in suit. Moreover, because the issues of patent infringement and validity,
not to mention unenforceability, are never finally adjudicated, the patent owner
remains free to file yet another lawsuit against the next defendant. With each
lawsuit, such a patent owner hopes to either find defendants who will settle rather
than fight, or win a court decision in its favor, should the court reach a decision with
respect to any of the issues in the case.
This article advocates that courts should retain subject-matter jurisdiction over
claims or counterclaims asserting unenforceability in cases brought pursuant to the
388
DJA, especially in view of the holding in Fin Control.
At present, patent law does
not recognize invalidity or unenforceability as stand-alone causes of action. 38 9 With
invalidity, this is less of a problem because an accused infringer, even after a lawsuit
prevent the plaintiff from enforcing the patent). Id.; see also Clipper Exxpress v. Rocky Mountain
Motor Tariff Bureau, Inc. 690 F.2d 1240, 1251 (9th Cir. 1982) (discussing the defendant's claim
under the "Noerr-Pennington doctrine," which renders bona fide efforts to obtain or influence
legislative, executive, judicial or administrative actions immune from antitrust liability).
385Arrowhead Indus. Water, Inc. v. Ecolochem, Inc., 846 F.2d 731 (Fed . Cir. 1988); Walter
Kidde Portable Equip., Inc. v. Universal Sec. Instruments, Inc., 479 F.3d 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Fin
Control Sys. Pty, Ltd. v. OAM, Inc., 265 F.3d 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
386 See Super Sack Mfg. Corp. v. Chase Packaging Corp. 57 F.3d 1054, 1058-59 (Fed. Cir.
1995).
387 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2006) ("The court in exceptional cases may award reasonable attorney fees
to the prevailing party.").
388 Fin Control Sys. Pty, Ltd. v. OAM, Inc., 265 F.3d 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
389 See In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 200 (2d Cir. 2005).
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has been dismissed on subject-matter jurisdiction grounds, may present its evidence
390
to the United States Patent & Trademark Office in a re-examination proceeding.
This is not the case with unenforceability claims. In the face of damning evidence in
an infringement first case, a patent holder may escape adjudication via issuing a
covenant not to sue. There is no mechanism by which claims of unenforceability may
be adjudicated in these circumstances. Furthermore, an otherwise defective patent
may continue to be enforced against the public. 391 Additionally, it is stated public
policy that invalid or unenforceable patents be removed from the public record to
avoid impeding valid competition.3 92 Using the tools provided by the DJA, and the
reasons for which it was enacted, the court can find the avenue to deter bad faith
litigation by removing the incentive for a patent owner to bring suspect infringement
lawsuits.
As a stronger message, however, and as a means to bring the law into broader
conformance in these situations, the Federal Circuit can do better by generally and
explicitly overturning Super Sack. The tools to do so resides in the FRCPs,
specifically FRCP 41(a)(2), which is specifically phrased to provide a defendant the
right to have counterclaims heard. 393 Two mechanisms by which jurisdiction can be
retained presently exist. First, FRCP 41(a)(2) permits the dismissal of the case in its
entirety, but under "terms and conditions" that may be imposed by the Court, in its
discretion, after weighing all the circumstances.3 94 These "terms and conditions"
could include levying attorney's fees and costs against the putative plaintiff who
prosecutes costly lawsuits, only to have them vanish on a mere promise. This would
return the infringement defendant to a position that it was in before the lawsuit was
filed. Second, FRCP 41(a)(2) only allows an action to be dismissed if there are no
counterclaims pending before the trial court.3 95 Courts have the discretionary power
to fully entertain the motions before them prior to dismissing a case for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction. 396 In a long fought lawsuit, even if the issues of patent
validity or unenforceability are "mooted" by the patent owner's covenant not to sue,

390 See Linear Tech. Corp. v. Micrel, Inc., 524 F. Supp. 2d 1147, 1153-54 (N.D. Cal. 2005). See
gonerally 35 U.S.C. §§ 301-07 (2006) (describing the request for re-examination process).
'391
See Vicki M. Franks, The Legal Landscape of Subject-Matter Jurisdiction, Individual
Patent Claims, and Stipulations or Covenants Not to Sue.* Do We Need to Stop and Ask for
Directions?, 12 J. TECH. L. & POL'Y 149 (2007) (addressing the role of subject-matter jurisdiction in
patent litigation).
392 See Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 664 (1969) (noting the need to keep the market free
of worthless patents).
'393 See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(a)(2).
Except as provided in Rule 41(a)(1), an action may be dismissed at the
plaintiffs request only by court order, on terms that the court considers proper. If
a defendant has pleaded a counterclaim before being served with the plaintiffs
motion to dismiss, the action may be dismissed over the defendant's objection only
if the counterclaim can remain pending for independent adjudication. Unless the
order states otherwise, a dismissal under this paragraph (2) is without prejudice.
Id.
394 Id.; see also Lunn v. United Aircraft Corp., 26 F.R.D. 12, 18 (D. Del. 1960) (noting that the
court must address the equities involving both the defendant and the plaintiff in granting a
voluntary dismissal).
3 5 See Adney v. Miss. Lime Co., 241 F.2d 43, 45 (7th Cir. 1957).
396 See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(a)(2).

[8:1 2008]

Sacking Super Sack

the court still retains jurisdiction as between the parties to that lawsuit for the
3 97
purpose of dispensing justice.
What better way for the Federal Circuit to give teeth to the court's tools of
procedure than to allow the district court to bring the defendant in an infringement
suit back to a position reasonably resembling the one it was in before an
infringement action was hastily brought and later withdrawn when the prospects for
victory dimmed. A bad faith patent owner would certainly have second thoughts
before bringing such a lawsuit if it knew that it would not get off lightly. Finally, as
a public policy statement, following FRCP 42(a)(2) should reduce the number of
meritless patent cases brought as a cudgel to suppress competition, and would do
more to reduce the district court's patent docket than blindly following the Super
Sack holding. Allowing Super Saek to accumulate progeny, without overruling it or
severely limiting its application, may permit a court to easily dispose of one hard
patent case, but, like cutting off a hydra's head, the unintended result is that at least
two more are brought.

397

See Samsung Elecs. Co. v. Rambus Inc., 440 F. Supp. 2d 495 (E.D. Va. 2006).

